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‘Democracy means being in touch and in tune with life as it’s lived in our communities, and 
that is what we should expect from our leaders…’ – Barak Obama   
 
Political parties are indispensable conduits for the enjoyment of political rights as they are 
responsible for aggregating and articulating interests, developing competing policy proposals, 
organising legislatures and co-ordinating the formation and activities of government, none of 
which is possible without adequate financial resources. The money political parties derive from 
the public revenue is not enough to allow them to run successful election campaigns, and as a 
result, they are left largely reliant on private sources of funding. However, the way in which 
this private funding infiltrates the political system has proven to be one of the biggest threats 
to democracy. An insidious link, fuelled by a lack of transparency and openness, is seen 
between those who donate money and those who receive it. Often, this culminates in a quid 
pro quo relationship between the donor and the donee which we see manifest as rampant 
corruption within the (dys)functioning of our state arms. In an effort to attenuate the ruinous 
effects of the unregulated passage of money through political systems, most democracies 
around the world have moved towards enacting regulatory disclosure laws, which are premised 
on the understanding that information on the private funding of political parties, and how this 
money is used, is essential for the effective exercise of the right to make political choices and 
to participate meaningfully in elections.  
 
No universally accepted model has been developed to regulate political finance; however, it is 
accepted that the core feature of any transparency policy is to be firmly rooted in the principles 
of access to information which in turn promotes accountability, responsiveness and openness.  
This paper examines whether South Africa’s legal framework on political finance adequately 
addresses the problems that exist in relation to the funding of political parties and particularly, 
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The academic study of corruption in South Africa indicates that it exists in large, unsettling 
and unrelenting ways1 and that it is directly linked to moral and economic decay.2 South 
Africa’s history of corruption dates back to the apartheid era when the government was 
obsessed with official secrecy,3 thus allowing them to practise esoteric governance. The lack 
of administrative transparency and accountability promoted criminality4 and was structurally 
conducive to corruption.5 Corruption has been described as ‘the abuse of public office for 
private gain’.6 We see the magnitude of this abuse displayed in the current revelations of the 
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the 
Public Sector which have illustrated just how money buys influence, undermines basic 
democratic principles and cripples society. Corruption has settled mainly in government 
structures (public office) because it is on this level that the quid pro quo relationship is most 
beneficial to corrupt benefactors. Government structures are occupied through the contestation 
for public office by political parties, and campaigns for public office are usually waged at a 
great cost.7 However, as Butler observes, the role of money in politics remains a vexed issue 
in many political systems8 because it is impossible in modern-day politics to divorce money 
from power.9 Government officials wield enormous power and, as Sir John Dalberg-Acton so 
aptly put it, ‘all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’.10 Absolute 
corruption proliferates in the secrecy that underpins government action and decision-making 
 
1 It is estimated hundreds of millions of rands are lost yearly due to corruption. 
www.businesstech.co.za/news/trending/99074/10-corruption-scandals-that-rocked-south-africa/ (accessed 25 
May 2020). 
2 https://www.intechopen.com/books/trade-and-global-market/corruption-causes-and-consequences (accessed 
19 June 2020). 
3 I Currie I & J Klaaren J The Promotion of Access to Information Commentary (2002) Siber Ink at 2. 
4 Currie & Klaaren op cit (n 3) at 21. 
5 Currie & Klaaren op cit (n 3) at 21. 
6 ‘Impact of corruption on governance and socio-economic rights page 1’ available at 
http://www.casac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/IMPACT-OF-CORRUPTION1.pdf  (accessed 26 August 
2018). 
7 It is estimated that about R2 billion was spent on campaigning for the 2019 elections 
www.thesouthafrican.com/news/what-political-parties-spend-election-campaign-2019/  
8 A Butler (ed) Paying for Politics: Party Funding and Political Change in South Africa and the Global South 
(2011), Jacana Media at 1. 
9 Butler op cit (n 8) at 1. 
10 JN Figgis & RV Lawrence Historical Essays and Studies (1907) MacMillan. 
2 
 
despite the right of access to information11 guaranteed by the Constitution.12 This paper seeks 
to assess how the entitlement to access information can be carved into an effective and 
workable legal regime capable of addressing the problems that plague political finance, 
particularly corruption.  
Currie and De Waal opine that ‘accountability is unattainable if the government has a 
monopoly on the information that informs its actions and decisions’.13 This, according to the 
authors, is the basis of claims to a right of access to information.14 Access to information gives 
rise to entitlements and obligations, linking itself to the relevant human rights protections 
afforded to other rights15 and asserting itself as an essential component of the democratic 
process. As Transparency International puts it, ‘countries successful at curbing corruption have 
a long tradition of government openness, freedom of the press, transparency and access to 
information’.16 The right of access to information guaranteed by the Constitution entitles 
everyone to have access to any information held by the state17 or any information held by any 
other person, which is relevant for the protection of any rights.18 Democracy is governed by 
explanation19 and the Promotion of Access to Information Act (the PAIA)20 provides the 
contextual reference to the rights and entitlements attendant on this explanation. This is because 
the fundamental aim of any access to information legislation is to promote good government 
and in turn good governance.21 On this point, the Constitutional Court has specifically held that  
‘Details governing freedom of information are not ordinarily found in a 
constitution, and it is unlikely that the drafters of the CPs contemplated that such 
provisions would be contained in the NT itself. It is also significant that freedom 
of information is … directed at promoting good government’.22  
 
 
11 S 32. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996 Constitution). 
13I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 684. 
14 Currie & De Waal op cit (n 13) at 684. 
15 This can in turn be linked to s 8 of the Constitution with provides that ‘[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all law, 
and binds the legislature, the executive and the judiciary and all organs of state’.  
16 https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-to-stop-corruption-5-key-ingredients# (accessed 24 May 2020). 
17 S 32(1)(a). 
18 S 32(1)(b). 
19 Currie & De Waal op cit (n 13) at 684. 
20 Act 2 of 2000. 
21 https://socialprotection-humanrights.org/framework/principles/ensure-transparency-and-access-to-
information/ (accessed 20 July 2018). 
22 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (‘First Certification Judgment’) para 85.  
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Good governance requires an administration that is sensitive and responsive to the needs of the 
people and at the same time effective in coping with emerging challenges in society,23 by 
framing and implementing appropriate laws and measures. Wixley and Everingham explain 
that governance is concerned with the structures and processes associated with management, 
decision-making and control in organisations.24 Bolton surmises that government (decisions) 
are mainly attached to the policies they aim to achieve which, she explains, from a public 
interest point of view require an understanding of the policy and philosophy behind government 
decisions.25 Good governance therefore demands strict rules of transparency and 
accountability.26  
An understanding of what informs government actions and decisions requires a clear 
understanding of the mainspring behind political policy reform. Policy, according to the Centre 
for Civic Education, is 
‘made in response to [an] issue or problem that requires attention. Policy is 
orientated toward a goal or desired state, such as the solution of a problem. Policy 
is ultimately made by governments, even if the ideas come from outside 
government or through the interaction of government and the public’.27  
Government policies are usually framed by political parties and in this regard, they wield 
immense power within the democratic process and have been said to be indispensable conduits 
for the enjoyment of political rights.28 As such, they are afforded resources because they are 
recognised as the ‘veritable vehicles chosen for facilitating and entrenching democracy’.29 
Elections are not won cheaply as political parties engage in a wide range of functions in their 
contest for public office. These functions, together with the prevailing socio-economic realities, 
place great reliance on parties’ receipt of private sources of funding. This funding is regrettably 
clouded in secrecy owing to the insufficiency of regulatory reforms, and as the universal 
consensus rightly echoes, ‘unregulated and poorly managed political finance is often ... one of 
the biggest threats to democracy’.30  
 
23 A A Senghore ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in the Gambia: Essays on Social Adjustment’ 
(2008) Cenmedra at 82. 
24 T Wixley T and G Everingham ‘Corporate Governance’ 3ed (2010) Siber Ink at 1.  
25 Bolton P ‘The law of government procurement in South Africa’ (2007) LexisNexis Butterworths at 5 
26 Senghore op cit (n 23) at 82. 
27 https://www.civiced.org/pc-program/instructional-component/public-policy (accessed 23 May 2020). 
28 My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2015] ZACC 31 para 43 (‘My Vote 
Counts 1’). 
29 Ramakatsa v Magashule & Others [2012] ZACC 31 para 67 (‘Ramakatsa’). 
30 https://www.u4.no/publications/the-role-of-political-party-finance-reform-in-the-transition-from-dominant-to-
competitive-party-systems (accessed 22 January 2020). 
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Historically, regulation of political party funding was limited to their receipt of public funds 
and this was legislated through the Public Funding of Political Parties Act,31 which Act was 
borne of section 23632 of the Constitution and a drafting process which commenced in 1997 
when the Promotion of Multi-Party Democracy Bill33 was introduced.34 Today, on the 
understanding that transparency and access to information are inextricably linked as ‘essential 
components of a rights-based social protection system’,35 the Political Party Funding Act36 has 
been signed into law. Hyslop asserts that ‘the issue of corruption is also a question of 
representation and of moral economy’.37 Given that the South African democracy is fashioned 
primarily as a representative democracy,38 this paper assesses the Political Party Funding Act’s 
sufficiency as an anti-corruption framework.  
1.2. Problem statement and research question 
South Africa operates within a multi-party political system which enables multiple parties to 
contest elections and have capacity to gain control of government office.39 Apart from 
contesting elections, some of the functions of political parties have been described as including 
‘aggregating and articulating interests, developing competing policy proposals that provide 
voice and choice, … organising legislatures, co-ordinating the formation and activities of 
government …’.40 none of which is possible without adequate financial resources. As Butler 
explains, political funds are mainly derived from public and private sources41 and within each 
category a distinction is made between ‘legitimate and illegitimate funds, covert and overt 
funds, concentrated sources that create dependency versus dispersed ones that build relations 
between society and party’.42 Within these dichotomies it is noted that the main source of 
funding remains private funding.43 Private donors play a dominant role in party financing, 
 
31 103 of 1997. 
32 To enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties 
participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis.  
33 B 69-97. 
34 This Bill was adopted by Parliament in October 1997 and came into force in April 1998 as the Public Funding 
of Political Parties Act 103 of 1997. 
35 https://socialprotection-humanrights.org/framework/principles/ensure-transparency-and-access-to-
information/ (accessed 20 July 2018). 
36 6 of 2018. 
37 J Hyslop ‘Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid’ (2005) 31(4) Journal of Southern African Studies 
at 774. 
38 Currie & De Waal op cit (n 13) at 447. 
39 Bolton op cit (n 25) at 5. 
40 https://www.u4.no/publications/the-role-of-political-party-finance-reform-in-the-transition-from-dominant-to-
competitive-party-systems (accessed 18 December 2019). 
41 Butler op cit (n 8) at 5.  
42 Butler op cit (n 8) at 5. 
43 Butler A op cit (n 8) at 2. 
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fashioning patterns of dependency, collusion and corruption between donors, recipients and 
those who get to spend the funds.44 Money is often given in return for favours which in turn 
usually has the effect of corrupting45 the political system in addition to undermining its 
legitimacy.46 Those who are unable to contribute to party reserves are often excluded from the 
political equality promised to them.47 As was mentioned in My Vote Counts v President of the 
Republic of South Africa48 
‘The prospect of political parties being beholden to donors, especially substantial 
donors, creates considerable scope for corruption. Secret funding creates the risk 
that public officials may extend undue and undetected favouritism towards those 
who funded their political progress. In this way, secret funding of political parties 
threatens to encourage or at least conceal corruption …’.49   
The insidious50 link between money and corruption is clearly highlighted by the phenomenon 
of ‘money politics’ which is characterised by an ‘arms race’ between political parties and their 
funders.51 It appears that the more the money is required to compete the more willing 
campaigners are to compromise principles and legality in order to secure funding.52 These 
compromises have seen an array of interventions being implemented internationally in an 
attempt to regulate the financing of politics. Regulation operates on the premise that 
transparency and access to information are inextricably linked. They are said to be ‘essential 
components of a rights-based social protection system’.53 While there is no universally 
accepted model for the regulation of political party finance, regulatory measures, which include 
bans on vote buying, disclosure rules, caps on campaign expenditure and contribution limits, 
have been widely accepted as being the most apposite means to assist in the fight against the 
corrupting effect of money in politics. Hyslop correctly asserts that ‘[t]he question of 
 
44 Butler op cit (n 8) at 1. 
45 According to the OECD Public Governance Reviews (2016) (Financing Democracy: Funding of Political 
Parties and Election Campaigns and the Risk of Policy Capture, OECD, Publishing, Paris). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264249455-en at 23 ‘when government policy-making is captured by individual 
donors with a significant amount of power and money, in whose favour the rules are bent, this leads to the 
erosion of democratic governance, the pulling apart of social cohesion, and undermining of crucial concepts that 
underlie democracy such as equal opportunities for all’. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 2017 (6) SA 501 (‘My Vote Counts WCC’). 
49 At 38.  
50 https://www.businessinsider.com/how-likely-people-are-to-be-corrupted-by-money-2013-6?IR=T (accessed 
18 December 2019). 
51 Butler op cit (n 8) at 5. 
52 Butler op cit (n 8) at 5. 
53 https://socialprotection-humanrights.org/framework/principles/ensure-transparency-and-access-to-
information/ (accessed 20 July 2018). 
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corruption is … central to battles over control of information’54 and it is against this backdrop 
that this paper seeks to review South Africa’s party funding regulation in light of international 
and domestic legal and political contexts and consider the question of whether it satisfactorily 
addresses the problems that exist in relation to the funding of political parties and particularly, 
the threat of corruption. 
1.3. Significance of the problem  
The act of suffrage is important because it encourages civic consciousness and political 
participation.55 Participation in turn creates a platform for scrutiny which helps people make 
informed choices.56 This view was confirmed when the Constitutional Court held in New 
National Party57 that ‘the mere existence of the right to vote without proper arrangements for 
its effective exercise does nothing for a democracy. It is both empty and useless’.58 Taking it a 
step further in the My Vote Counts 1 minority judgment, Cameron J held that:  
‘Section 19(1) of the Constitution envisages that every citizen is “free to make 
political choices” [...] But that choice, like all others, is only valuable if one 
knows what one is choosing. It loses its value if it is based on insufficient 
information or misinformation.’59  
In the widely quoted United States case of Buckley v Valeo60 the Supreme Court held that:  
‘First, disclosure provides the electorate with information “as to where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid 
the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office”. It allows the voters to 
place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often 
possible solely than on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The 
sources of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests to 
which a candidate is more likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions 
of future performance in office.  
Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance 
of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of 
publicity. This exposure may discourage those who would use money for 
 
54 Hyslop op cit (n 37) at 775. 
55 https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/how-to-encourage-better-and-more-
meaningful-political-participation-in-the-us/ (accessed 19 May 2019). 
56 My Vote Counts 1 para 41. 
57 [1999] ZACC 5. 
58 At para 11. See also My Vote Counts 1  minority judgment para 42-43; President of the Republic of South 
Africa and others v M & G Media Ltd [2011] ZACC 32) para 10 (‘M & G Media’); Democratic Alliance v 
African National Congress [2015] ZACC 1 para 124; Oriani-Ambrosini v Sisulu, Speaker of the National 
Assembly [2012] ZACC 21 para 64. 
59 My Vote Counts 1 minority judgment para 39. 
60 Buckley v Valeo 424 US1 (1976) at para 62. 
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improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed with 
information about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better able to detect 
any post-election special favors that may be given in return’. 
The right to vote is a hybrid right. It does not ‘consist merely of the entitlement to make a cross 
upon a ballot paper …. It is a right to vote for a political party, knowing how it will contribute 
to our constitutional democracy and the attainment of our constitutional goals’.61 Put 
differently, the importance of suffrage is more than just an act of selecting a vote; it is an 
investment for the future62 which aims for an ideal of development and equality. However, as 
pointed out in United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa63 
‘voters have no control over the conduct of their representatives. They cannot dictate to them 
how they must vote in Parliament, nor do they have any legal right to insist that they conduct 
themselves and refrain from conducting themselves in a particular manner’.64 Given this 
reality, voters can only exercise control over their votes. However, the proper exercise of this 
control is negated by the lack of understanding about party policy formation in general and 
party funding information in particular. This current political narrative, which will be 
expounded upon in the next chapter, allows corruption to find a fertile breeding ground post-
elections because South African politicians benefit from the partisan voting patterns fuelled by 
the deficiency of information. This is the practice which anti-corruption policies seek to 
attenuate because  
‘Corruption is antithetical to democracy and the rule of law as it diverts resources 
that are needed to improve the lives of citizens to enrich a few at great cost to 
many.65 Corruption prevents the state from fulfilling its constitutional obligations, 
erodes the legitimacy of the democratic government and subverts the rule of law. 
It gnaws away at the ethical fabric of our society and stifles economic growth.’66  
  
 
61 My Vote Counts 1 para 41. 
62 www.quora/com/why-is-right-to-vote-important (accessed on 7 March 2019). 
63 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC) (‘UDM’). 
64 At 49. 
65 Casac ‘Corruption: Towards a Comprehensive Societal Response’ available at http://www.casac.org.za/wp-




1.4. Literature Review  
Currie and De Waal state that ‘public access to information is fundamental to encouraging 
transparency and accountability in the way government and public authorities operate. It is an 
important weapon in the fight against corruption’.67 The source of corruption in South Africa 
is rooted in the country’s bureaucratic traditions, political development and social history.68 
Corruption has thrived on institutional weaknesses69 as it is rooted in secrecy. As the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act70 notes:  
‘Corruption and related corrupt activities undermine the [rights enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights], endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the 
institutions and values of democracy and ethical values and morality and 
jeopardise sustainable development, the rule of law and the credibility of 
governments …’.71 
And as Reddy correctly points out:  
‘After we recognise the existence of procedural democracy in South Africa, 
notice that it mostly functions according to formal rules established in the 
Constitution and appreciate the mammoth struggle and sacrifices involved to 
bring it about; it is difficult to ignore the signs of state and institutional decay, 
intra-elite conflict, growing popular discontent, and political fragility in the face 
of society’s demands and development challenges’.72  
In their aptly titled article ‘Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When do voters 
support corrupt politicians’73 Winters and Weitz-Shapiro correctly point out that ‘in a 
democracy, corruption undermines the quality of representation when elected politicians make 
decisions motivated by the desire for personal enrichment rather than the preference of voters. 
This decreased accountability poses a real threat to stability in young democracies’.74 Our own 
courts have surmised that the seriousness of the offence of corruption cannot be 
overemphasised. It offends the rule of law and the principles of good governance.75 As pointed 
out above, good governance is concerned with strict rules of accountability, rooted in 
 
67 Currie & De Waal op cit (n 13) at 684. 
68 G T Mirugi-Mukundi (2006) ‘Impact of corruption on governance and socio-economic rights’ 1 available at 
http://www.casac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/IMPACT-OF-CORRUPTION1.pdf (accessed 26 August 
2018). 
69 Ibid. 
70 12 of 2004. 
71 Preamble. 
72 T Reddy ‘ANC Decline, Social Mobilization and Political Society: Understanding South Africa’s Evolving 
Political Culture’ (2010) 37(2-3) Politikon at 185. 
73 Comparative Politics 45(4) (July 2013). 
74 M S Winters & R Weitz-Shapiro ‘Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When do voters support 
corrupt politicians’ (2013) 45(4) Comparative Politics at 418.  
75 S v Shaik & Others 2007 (1) SA 240 (SCA) at 223.  
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transparency and openness. Ensuring transparency, as Mureinik76 explains, is a means towards 
two ends. First, it aims to promote the accountability of government, and secondly it aims to 
promote greater public participation in government. He states further that transparency, and by 
extension access to information, are important weapons in the fight against corruption.77 
Jagwanth78 explains further:  
‘The right of access to information … is not only important for its facilitation of 
an accountable and democratic government in which power is exercised 
rationally and open to public scrutiny. It is also important in that it is closely 
linked to other rights. It allows an individual to access information that may have 
an impact on her or him so that she or he can meaningfully exercise the other 
rights in the Bill of Rights’. 
Access to information laws provide a basis for the informed discussion of government policies 
and actions. They are premised on the understanding that in modern democracies citizens are 
entitled to participate in decision-making processes and that their role is not simply confined 
to the election of representatives.79 Section 9(e)(iii) of the PAIA reiterates this by providing 
that the objects of the Act were generally, to promote transparency, accountability and effective 
governance of all public and private bodies by empowering and educating everyone to 
effectively scrutinise, and participate in decision-making by public bodies that affects their 
rights.80 An assertion that rights have been affected applies mainly to private information; 
however Currie and De Waal explain that ‘[t]he good-government rationale for disclosure is 
often applied to private-sector information if it has public implications’.81 Party funding 
information, notwithstanding the [private] legal nature of political parties, necessarily has 
public implications because of their proximity to government office. Access to their financial 
information is ‘therefore part of the broad constitutional project of establishing a democratic 
system of government’.82 As Magnus Oham83 states: ‘[o]ne of the main factors preventing the 
political process in many countries from attaining democratic ideals is the influence of money’. 
 
76 Mureinik E ‘Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability’ (1993) Acta Juridica 35. 
77 Mureinik op cit (n 76) at 35. 
78 Jagwanth S ‘The right to information as a Leverage Right’ in Calland R & Tilley A (eds) (2002) The Right to 
Know the Right to Live: Access to Information and Socio-economic Justice 3.  
79 Currie and De Waal op cit (n13) at 692. 
80 See Currie and De Waal op cit (n13) at 684 (footnote 1) where an example of providing access to information 
is found in the revolutions of Eastern and Central Europe during 1989 where the public in the German Democratic 
Republic was given access to television from the Federal Republic (West Germany) which allowed the public to 
make their own comparisons and form their own opinions about their Communist leaders rather than accept the 
opinions as dictated to them by the party.  
81 Currie and De Waal op cit (n 13) at 694. 
82 Currie and De Waal op cit (n 13) at 691. 
83 https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/funding-of-political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pdf 
(accessed 10 July 2018). 
10 
 
Klaaren supports this assertion by stating that ‘an open society, presumes, at a minimum, a 
condition of no political capture as a precondition for democracy’.84 A Brazilian experiment 
by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro which hypothesised whether or not voters vote for corrupt 
politicians because they lack the information85 necessary to help them make informed decisions 
in the voting booth or because they hope that they will benefit86 in the long run from a corrupt 
officials term in office, found that ‘when given sufficiently specific, credible, and accessible 
information about corruption … voters … express a willingness to reject politicians described 
as corrupt’.87 This conclusion feeds neatly into the standards set by international law which 
require, at a minimum, the implementation of access to information laws as means of curbing 
corruption.88 
1.5. Research Methodology  
The research methodology in this paper will utilise a qualitative desktop study relying on 
primary sources (e.g. legislation, national and international instruments and case law), as well 
as secondary sources (e.g. academic books, journal articles and essays). It will examine, 
evaluate and analyse these sources in order to gain an understanding of the reasons, opinions 
and motivations used in support of, and in opposition to, the research question. An analysis of 
this research will provide a basis upon which to identify loopholes and shortcomings in the 
current regulatory instruments and offer propositions to ensure the realisation of an effective 
and workable transparency policy consonant with international best practice and the values 
underpinned by the Constitution. 
1.6. Provisional chapter structure 
This study will be divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 
This chapter outlines the background to the study, the problem statement; the significance of 
the research; the relevant literature which has been reviewed as well as the methodology to be 




84 Klaaren J ‘My Vote Counts and the transparency of political party funding in South Africa’ Law, (2008) 
Democracy and Development (2008) at 2. 
85 Information Hypothesis.  
86 Trade-off Hypothesis.  
87 Winters and Weitz-Shapiro op cit (n 74) at 419. 
88 See international law instruments discussed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2  
This chapter will provide an assessment of the centrality of political parties and their 
importance within the greater democratic scheme in order to opine on the uniqueness of the 
political culture within South Africa and its impact on democracy.  
Chapter 3 
This chapter will provide an assessment of why the PAIA, as the principal transparency statute, 
fails to address the party funding problem by examining its jurisprudential journey through 
IDASA, My Vote Counts (1) and My Vote Counts (2).  
Chapter 4 
This chapter will provide a review of international legal and political contexts and their 
importance in helping South Africa to understand its own regulatory trajectory.  
Chapter 5 
This chapter will provide a critical evaluation of South Africa’s own efforts to regulate political 
finance, juxtaposed with international best practice.   
Conclusion 
The conclusion will draw upon the realities presented by corruption, the mechanisms in place 
to curb the scourge and the lessons from international best practice in order to opine whether 
or not South Africa’s regulatory framework adequately addresses the problems that plague the 
funding of political parties, particularly the threat of corruption. 
 
1.7. Conclusion to chapter 1 
According to Transparency International, understanding corruption is key to fighting it.89 
Corruption is deeply rooted into the fabric of the world, and countries around the world are 
moving to implement anti-corruption frameworks as they recognise that the hallmark of any 
open and democratic society is a government that accounts for its use of power;90 and a 
government which is unable to do so, lends itself to the infiltration of corrupt activities. These 
anti-corruption frameworks begin on the premise that access to information is an essential 
component in the fight against corruption. As stated above, this is recognised in the obligations 
imposed by international law in promoting legislation for the fight against corruption. Since 
most governments are formed through political processes, it is important that access to 
 
89 https://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/education (accessed 24 May 2020). 
90 Currie & Klaaren op cit (n 3) at 17. 
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information is recognised as an ‘inalienable entitlement’ of human beings91 that attaches 
intimately to an individual’s ability to make an informed choice, which choice is premised on 
an investment in the welfare, not only of the voter, but of the nation at large.92 In South Africa, 
despite the recognition and promotion of access to information as a fundamental human right, 
corruption has found a way to become institutionalised in the public sphere,93 where credibility 
in a public service concerned with citizen governance must be beyond reproach . This paper 
interrogates the entitlement of access to information in South Africa and assesses its sufficiency 
as an anti-corruption reform mechanism. 
  
 
91 Currie & Klaaren op cit (n 3) at 7. 
92 https://medium.com/buhaykolehiyo/the-importance-of-suffrage-national-elections-a-personal-perspective-
ca18ac5000a3 (accessed 7 April 2019). 
93 See www.businesstech.co.za/news/trending/99074/10-corruption-scandals-that-rocked-south-africa/ 




POLITICAL CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY  
2.1. Introduction: 
Lodge surmises that ‘secrecy concerning the sources of political party electioneering funding 
can be a major cause of corruption …’.94 It is against this backdrop that the first chapter stressed 
the importance of fostering transparency and accountability through access to information 
about political finance. Corruption, mainly public sector corruption, and the continued 
vagueness attaching to political finance, serve to exacerbate the problem in South Africa. 
Transparency, particularly political finance transparency, is directly linked to the effectiveness 
of the functioning of government, its overall governance and its ability to curb the scourge of 
corruption.  
This chapter, in seeking to emphasise the significance of political parties and the need for more 
transparent politics, will assess the political culture of South Africa’s electoral system and how 
this culture continues to influence voting patterns − having a direct impact on the proliferation 
of corruption. The importance of this chapter lies in the reality that suffrage, being a necessary 
condition for democracy, fails to meet the needs95 of the political system, which is largely 
influenced by the political history of the electoral system in place.96  
The end of apartheid in South Africa was followed by a new Constitution, the preamble of 
which declares the intention to ‘heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’.97 These democratic values98 
include human dignity, equality, supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law, universal 
adult suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
 
94 T Lodge ‘Countering public corruption in South Africa: Transformation 48’ (2001) Michigan State University 
Library 63-64. 
95 www.hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/a-long-walk-to-universal-franchise-in-south-africa-1 (accessed 
9 February 2020). 
96 R Friedman ‘Political Party Finance – The Global Picture’ Available at https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-
briefs/political-party-funding-iv-the-global-picture (accessed 23 October 2018).  
97 Preamble to the Constitution. 
98 S 1 of the Constitution provides that 
The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.  
(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.  
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.  
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democratic government. The need for free and fair elections was influenced by the text of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states in Article 21(3) that:  
‘The will of the people shall be the basis of authority of government; this shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’.  
South Africa’s apartheid history was pivotal in shaping the multiparty democracy99 in which 
the current political system operates. Political freedoms, and more specifically the right to vote, 
were hard-won entitlements resulting in a political system fashioned upon a political culture 
which, as a result of the historical denial of these civil liberties, is largely influenced by the 
electoral system in place and the dominance of one political party.100 The political landscape 
is still largely ‘characterised by the hegemonic stature of the African National Congress (ANC) 
which, inherited an abundance of popular legitimacy and enviable state capacity’.101 The ANC 
has been ‘able to draw upon the inherited racial cleavages102 in the country103 because it derives 
its dominant position from its social support and this has been retained despite the employment 
of the proportional representation election method’.104 Under a ‘list system’ of proportional 
representation, the electorate chooses which party to vote for, and the party is in turn 
accountable to the electorate.105 However, as illustrated in the previous chapter, this choice is 
only valuable when one knows what one is choosing.106  
Since 1994, South Africa has enjoyed six relatively uncontroversial elections and is said to be 
on the road to ‘democratic consolidation’,107 despite there being a perpetual debate around the 
quality of that democracy.108 The Democracy Index109 has classified South Africa’s democracy 
 
99 S 1(d) of the Constitution.  
100 Reddy op cit (n 72) 186. 
101 Ibid. 
102 R Southall ‘The state of democracy in South Africa’ (2000) 38(3) Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics 153. 
103 JE Lane & S Arson S ‘South Africa: Explaining Democratic Stability’ (2007) Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics at 224. 
104 Lane & Ersson op cit (n 103) at 224. 
105 First Certification Judgment para 186. 
106 My Vote Counts 1 para 39. 
107 See also My Vote Counts 1 para 9 where the Speaker of Parliament is quoted as saying that ‘the passing of 
the Promotion of Multi-Party Democracy Bill represents a very significant step in the ongoing process of 
consolidating and entrenching a multi-party democracy in South Africa and that the key to the success of our 
new emerging democracy is the role of strong, resilient, democratically elected political parties’.  
108 Southall op cit (n 102) at 147 (footnotes omitted); See also Lane & Ersson op cit (n 103) at 222. 
109 Index compiled by UK based company, Economist Intelligence Unit, that measures the state of democracy in 
167 countries using 60 indicators which are grouped into five different categories measuring pluralism, civil 




as a ‘flawed democracy’,110 suggesting that elections are free and fair and basic civil liberties 
are largely honoured. However, there are significant faults within our democracy, which are 
noted as ‘an under-developed political culture, low levels of participation in politics, problems 
with functioning governance and high levels of corruption’.111 There is also rising concern 
globally about diminishing electoral participation, declining trust in public institutions, public 
discontent and hostility.112 Most of these problems are attributable to the lack of transparency 
between citizens and the government. Since the primary aim of the Constitution is to establish 
and safeguard a representative democracy, this chapter seeks to juxtapose South Africa’s 
unique political climate with the need for more inclusive and transparent politics.  
2.2. Suffrage in South Africa 
Historically, black people were denied the right to vote due to their ‘inferior educational 
status’.113 The Union of South Africa imposed strict or prohibitive voting conditions on people 
of colour114 and only white men were allowed to vote and be elected to Parliament.115 It was 
only when the homelands/Bantustans were granted ‘independence’ between 1970 and 1980 
that black people were allowed to vote in their mainly tribally demarcated areas.116 The 
formation of the tri-cameral parliament in 1983 allowed black South Africans to vote in black 
local government structures117 and it was within these strictures that the franchise was extended 
to people of colour. Under this exclusionary system, large proportions of government 
expenditure were allocated to secret votes and this allowed certain areas of bureaucratic activity 
to be protected from public scrutiny by reporting restrictions.118 What was known about 
corruption indicates that the poor and disenfranchised were its main victims119 ‘while those 
with the benefit of the franchise were much less likely to encounter corrupt officials as their 
 
110 In comparison there are also full democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes.  
111 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index (accessed on 24 June 2018). 
112 J Struwig, B Roberts & E Vivier ‘A vote of confidence: Election Management and Public Perceptions of 
Electoral Processes in South Africa’ (2011) 46(3.1) Journal of Public Administration – special issue Human 
Sciences Research Council 1137. 
113 Available at www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-elections-south-africa (accessed 10 July 2018). 
114 Ibid. In the Orange Free State and the Transvaal all black people were denied the right to vote and a similar 
ban was in place in Natal with nearly all blacks being denied the right to vote. However, in the Cape a number 
of black and coloured men were allowed to vote under a ‘colour-blind’ permission based on property 
requirements. White women were extended the franchise in 1930.  
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 https://artscomments.wordpress.com/2016/08/03/a-very-brief-history-of-voting-in-south-africa/ (accessed 8 
September 2018). 




lives were much less affected by bureaucratic controls and restrictions’.120 Today, despite the 
benefit of the franchise, all people continue to experience, in varying degrees, the crippling 
effects of corruption. This is so because ‘despite the scope of bureaucratic public accountability 
having widened, …  bodies which spend public money, escape public scrutiny’.121 
The democratic order that followed the transitional political negotiations sought to ‘lay [a] 
secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the 
past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian 
principles in violent conflict and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge’.122 As Von Holdt 
summarises:  
‘The negotiations, the draft constitution, the first democratic elections in 1994, 
… and the drafting of the Final Constitution represented a profound political 
rupture and the formation of a new symbolic order in which for the first time the 
black majority were recognised as full citizens’.123  
Since 1994, suffrage is guaranteed as a fundamental human right through sections 1(d) and 19 
of the Constitution. Section 1(d) provides that South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the values of universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular 
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness124 while section 19 provides that: 
(1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right –  
a. to form a political party;  
b. to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and  
c. to campaign for political party or cause.  
(2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body 
established in terms of the Constitution.  
(3) Every adult citizen has the right –  
a. to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the 
Constitution, and to do so in secret; and  




121 Lodge op cit (n 94) at 56. 
122 D Dyzenhaus Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order (1998) Juta & Co 2. 
123 K Von Holdt ‘Review of African political economy South Africa: the transition to violent democracy’ (2013) 
40(138) Review of African Political Economy 592.  
124 Together with all its entitlements (i.e. transparency, public engagement and participation). 
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While the empowering provision contained in section 1(d) does not in itself create an 
enforceable right,125 it is given effect to by section 19 which must then be construed 
consistently with section 1(d).126 The purpose of section 19 is twofold. On the one hand, it aims 
to prevent the wholesale denial of political rights from ever happening again,127 while on the 
other hand it aims to ‘ensure that citizens are able to align themselves freely with the political 
cause of the party of their choice …’.128 The scope and content of this right must therefore be 
ascertained by means of an interpretation process informed by a context that is both historical 
and constitutional.129 Section 19 must also be read and understood within the broader 
interpretative context of the Bill of Rights, which gives effect to the ‘broad constitutional 
commitment to democracy’130 by encouraging a reading which is generous and purposive, thus 
giving the rights-holder the full protection guaranteed by the right.131 This is significant 
because suffrage is seen as essential to democratic self-government.132 The importance of 
suffrage was emphasised as follows by the Constitutional Court: 
‘Universal adult suffrage on a common voters’ roll is one of the foundational 
values of our entire constitutional order. The achievement of the franchise has 
historically been important for both the acquisition of the rights of full and 
effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of race, and for the 
accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood. The universality of the 
franchise is important not only for nationhood and democracy. The vote of each 
and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says 
that everybody counts. In a country of great disparities of wealth and power it 
declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all 
belong to the same democratic South African nation; that our destinies are 
intertwined in a single interactive polity. Rights may not be limited without 
justification and legislation dealing with the franchise must be interpreted in 
favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement.’133 
 
 
125 It is important to note that the court in National Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime 
Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO) 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC), 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) para 
21 held that universal adult suffrage is one of the values on which the state is founded and does not create an 
enforceable right. It could be limited, but only if clear and convincing reasons were advanced. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ramakatsa para 64. 
128 Currie and De Waal op cit (n 13) at 448. 
129 Currie and De Waal op cit (n 13) at 446-6. See also Ramakatsa para 64. See also Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd; in re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 
& Others v Smit NO  2001 (1) SA 545 (CC).  
130 Currie and De Waal op cit (n 13) at 447. 
131 Ramakatsa para 70. 
132 Electoral Commission v Mhlope 2016 (5) SA 1 (CC) para 1. 
133 August and Another v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC).  
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To be sufficiently effective, the franchise must be exercised through free and fair elections 
which are not characterised by fear, intimidation or inhibiting factors,134 and which include the 
rights of freedom of association, freedom of speech, access to information and open access to 
adequate campaign funding.135 South Africa’s electoral model, commissioned to facilitate the 
entitlements in section 19 and section 1(d) of the Constitution, was borne of the desire to select 
‘an appropriate electoral system for the highly divided and unequal society in the process of a 
delicate transition’.136 It was decided that the basic electoral system should be that of 
proportional representation,137 selected for its inclusiveness, simplicity and tendency to 
encourage coalition government.138 Within this model, South Africa uses a closed-list 
proportional representation system which means the electorate votes for parties which must in 
return be accountable to the electorate.139 To achieve this, the parties submit lists to the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and whilst these lists are publicised widely for voters 
to consider, they are closed and cannot be altered by voters.140 The closed-list nature of the 
model deprives the electorate of meaningful party participation, and as a result, other facets of 
participation and representation become important entitlements in the democratic process.  
The electoral system in South Africa promotes the formation of socially inclusive political 
parties and civil electioneering. The electorate’s ability to meaningfully participate in the 
electoral process pivots on what they know about these political parties and their members. As 
pointed out in Ramakatsa, the success of political parties lies in the policies they adopt and 
solutions they put forward in addressing the challenges faced by communities.141 The types of 
party systems which develop are largely influenced by the type of electoral system at play. 
Electoral systems can also impact on the way parties campaign and behave, thus helping to 
determine the broader political climate.142 The electoral system the Constitution creates 
 
134 Currie and De Waal op cit (n 13) at 448. 
135 www.hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/a-long-walk-to-universal-franchise-in-south-africa-1 (accessed 9 
February 2020). 
136 https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/the-south-african-electoral-system (accessed 2 September 2018) 
(footnotes omitted). 
137 www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa  
(accessed 2 September 2018). 
138 Ibid. 
139 First Certification judgment at 186. 
140 W Louw ‘The South African Electoral System’ (2014) Helen Suzman Foundation Available at 
https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/the-south-african-electoral-system (accessed 3 September 2018).  
141 Ramakatsa at 65.  
142 D Nupen ‘Elections, Constitutionalism and Political Stability in South Africa’ (2004) 4(2) African Journal 
on Conflict Resolution at 131. See also K O’Regan ‘Political Parties in South Africa: The interface between 
Law and Politics’ Keynote address Cape Town 27 August 2010 at 9. 
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therefore pivots on political parties and whom they admit as members143 while the democratic 
order the Constitution envisages depends on the electorate and what they know about these 
parties and their members.  
2.3. Political culture144 in South Africa 
South Africa’s current political culture is largely influenced by the effects of the apartheid 
regime, under which the nation was ‘characterised by state-reinforced divisions expressed 
through unrelenting political oppression on the one hand and resistance on the other; social and 
racial discrimination which permeated general society; severe economic exploitation; 
inequalities and disparities’.145 The democratic settlement, which has been described as 
‘ambitious’,146 constituted a dramatic political shift147 which is strongly attached to ideology.148 
As one National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) shop steward explained: 
‘[r]emember we still have people who are still indebted, in a sense, that they still feel they owe 
their loyalty to the ruling party.’149 This indebtedness is confirmed by the reality that ‘the source 
of public confidence (in election results) is not the existence of efficient, independently 
managed elections, but rather, due to forgiveness of electoral process deficiencies by a country 
all too pleased to be governed by liberation leaders’.150 As Jensen so aptly puts it ‘[m]any today 
know the complex political reality of post-apartheid South Africa and in their minds the debt 
still remains unpaid’.151 These sentiments still largely influence152 the political choices made 
by the electorate. Unfortunately, the forgiveness of these electoral deficiencies permeates an 
ignorant acceptance of unscrupulous government action.  
 
143 My Vote Counts 1 para 32. 
144 GA Almond and S Verba ‘Attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards 
the role of the self in the system’ (1963) The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 13. 
145 www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/historical-and-political-context (accessed 12 July 2018). 
146 Von Holdt op cit (n 123) at 593. 
147 Von Holdt op cit (n 123) at 593. 
148 See M Paret ‘Working-class fragmentation, party politics, and the complexities of solidarity in South Africa’s 
United Front’ (2017) 65(2) The Sociological Review 278-280.  
149 Paret op cit (n 148) at 280. See also K J Maphunye, M L Ledwaba & M K Kobjana ‘Democracy without 
accountability, or accountability without democracy? Born-free perspectives of public representatives in South 
Africa’ (2014) 49(1) Journal of Public Administration 176; and J Kotze S & G Prevost ‘An assessment of 
political identity formation and party support of South Africa’s first post-apartheid generation’ 2015 44(4) 
Africa Insight, African Journals Online 151. 
150 Padmanabhan V ‘Democracy’s Baby Blocks: South Africa’s Electoral Commission’ (2002) 77(4) New York 
University Law Review 1160-1161. 
151 S Jensen ‘Shosholoza: Political Culture in South Africa between the Secular and the Occult’ (2012) 38(1) 
Journal of Southern African Studies 104. 
152 A Habib & S Naidu ‘Race, Class and Voting Patterns in. South Africa’s Electoral System: Ten Years of 
Democracy’ 86 and 91. 
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Since the organising principle of society in South Africa has historically been colour, it is 
hardly surprising that interests are still perceived in racial terms.153 This being a reality, South 
Africa has tried to entrench equality through a number of institutions154 that are conducive to 
democratic stability. There is therefore a ‘Constitutional Court with the power of legal review, 
an Ombudsman, proportional representation and political decentralisation. At the same time, 
there is a presidential system of government based upon the dominant position of one of the 
political parties. One of the major findings in the literature on democracy is that a predominant 
position for one political party, which becomes almost identical with the state, makes 
democracy unstable’.155 Furthermore, the dominance of one political party is seen as more of 
a threat to democracy because of ‘the risk of a marriage between domination and concentration 
of power’.156 This creates long-term challenges to the integrity and effectiveness of the political 
system157 resulting in a democratic deficit.158 However as Habib points out ‘even though the 
electorate identifies less with the ANC, it sees no serious alternative to it. However, voting 
patterns indicate that the electorate is gravitating towards making rational choices during 
elections, which choices are based on the information available to them’.159 Critical political 
information is sparse and it is evident that this lacuna deprives the electorate the ability to make 
‘rational choices’ and offends against the ideal of the representative democracy envisaged by 
the Constitution. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro opine that ‘[a]ssuming that citizens disapprove of 
corruption, and given that by definition, democracies provide citizens with the right to choose 
their leaders, those regimes where citizens have the most power to select their leaders should 
be expected to suffer the least from corruption’.160 However, this is hardly the case and it 
follows that a change to the narrative underlying this political culture can only be achieved 
through meaningful public participation and more inclusive politics. Political discourse needs 
to be redesigned to promote transparency which in turn creates a platform for informed voting 
and is capable of triggering accountability because as Currie and Klaaren observe, ‘the 
hallmark of an open and democratic society is an account for the use of authority’.161 
  
 
153 Welsh D ‘Democratic challenges and opportunities for South Africa’ (2004) 23(3) Politeia 9. 
154 Chapter 9 Institutions. 
155 Lane & Ersson op cit (n 103) at 219. 
156 Lane & Ersson op cit (n 103) at 224. 
157 Lane & Ersson op cit (n 103) at 219-220. 
158 Lane & Ersson op cit (n 103) at 227. 
159 Habib op cit (n 152) at 86 and 91. 
160 Winters and Weitz-Shapiro op cit (n 74) at 418. 
161 Currie and Klaaren op cit (n 3) at 17. 
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2.4. Political Corruption in South Africa 
The political culture shown above interestingly ties in very aptly with the current political 
corruption we see exposed. Corruption is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. It is an 
inherited problem. According to Hyslop and Lodge, South Africa’s history of corruption can 
be traced back to 1870162 with every administration from then on tainted with some type of 
graft-related activity. Political corruption in South Africa is the birth-child of historical 
government corruption as a whole. Under apartheid, corruption festered through ‘preferential 
funding of Afrikaner cultural and educational institutions, the favouring of Afrikaner 
enterprises in the awarding of contracts and the vast extension of Afrikaner-dominated 
parastatal organisations all of which constituted policies which favoured rent-seeking 
government supporters’.163 This practice has found its way into the new democratic order in 
very much the same fashion as it existed in the Broederbond era.164 Much of it is attributable 
to Hyslop’s observation that  
‘… questions of corruption interact with the questions of risk and trust … in a specific 
way …. When the ANC entered government … the people who knew how to make the 
administrative system work and who advised on technical questions, were not trusted 
by the incoming regime …. The ANC therefore had a classic dilemma of any insurgent 
regime; they had to manage the immense risks of transition, while relying on a 
bureaucracy in which they had no trust. This circumstance has tended to favour a 
situation in which government prioritises considerations of political reliability of 
officials and of political stability over considerations of the effectiveness or probity of 
public services’.165  
This practice was conducive to the promotion of ‘political loyalties’166 and patronages which 
we still see today.  
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, observed that corruption ‘is found in all 
countries big and small, rich and poor but it is in the developing world that its effects are most 
destructive …. Corruption hurts the under-privileged disproportionately by diverting funds 
intended for socio-economic development, undermining a government’s ability to provide 
basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and 
aid’.167 The effect of corruption is that the capital allocated to address socio-economic 
 
162 Hyslop op cit (n 37) at 780.  
163 Hyslop op cit (n 37) at 782. 
164 Hyslop op cit (n37) at 782. 
165 Hyslop op cit (n 37) at 777. 
166 Hyslop op cit (n 37) at 778.  




challenges is selfishly exploited and there is a monopolising of senior positions and 
dysfunctioning government institutions and state owned enterprises.168 Interestingly, while the 
scandalous nature169 of corruption festers through secrecy and gnaws away at the ethical and 
democratic fabric which the Constitution seeks to create, the health of the South African 
democracy is evidenced through the freedoms afforded to the press.170 Many corrupt issues 
surface as a consequence of high-quality journalistic investigations,171 exposing much of which 
government denounces (in principle); but mainly as a ritualistic activity with no real relation 
to practical politics,172 the result of which is the existence of ‘persistent pervasive political 
corruption in a democracy’ and unfortunately voters, knowingly and unknowingly, continue to 
cast their ballots for corrupt politicians.173  
2.5. Conclusion  
Voting is regarded as a ‘formal expression of preference’174 and political parties are the 
vehicles through which this preference is exercised175 and the axis upon which our electoral 
system pivots. It is therefore crucial that the right to vote is given its fullest entitlement. As 
Fraser points out, to be effective, the formal right to vote requires a range of other liberties,176 
the most important of which is recognised to be access to information. As pointed out earlier, 
the mere existence of the right to vote without proper arrangements for its effective exercise 
does nothing for a democracy; it is both empty and useless177 and equivalent to a denial of this 
fundamental entitlement. Transparency, fostered by access to information, is one of the 
fundamental pillars of the effective exercise of the right to vote, as an electorate armed with 
knowledge about who is funding the political system is more likely to cast votes which resonate 
with their preferences. Absent this transparency, our democracy lends itself to the ruinous 
effects of a system allowed to fester under a protected veil of secrecy. As Pienaar states the 
‘lack of regulation of the funding of political parties still represents a major fault in many 
 
168 www.theconversatoin.com/how-corruption-is-fraying-south-africas-social-and-economic-fabric-80690 
(accessed on 26 August 2018). See also Winters and Weitz-Sharpiro op cit (n 74) at 418. 
169 Hyslop op cit (n 37) at 775. 
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countries’ anti-corruption frameworks’,178 a problem South Africa should not be sitting with 
26 years after democracy. 
The vision of society proclaimed by the Constitution is an open democracy which lends itself 
to many progressive elements but ironically, secrecy is  also one of them.179 As Currie and De 
Waal argue, ‘in an open and democratic society, … government should be accountable for its 
actions and decisions … ’.180 This means that people are entitled to have access to records, 
meetings, occasions where policy is formulated, and decisions taken about the use of public 
power.181 Historical disenfranchisement not only led to the recognition of and guarantee to the 
universal right to suffrage but also brought about a political culture that is deeply affected by 
the scars of the past. The tragic events of the apartheid regime have created patterns of blind 
loyalty resulting in partisan politics and the concentration of power and resources. This blind 
loyalty threatens to render our democracy unstable. It is unfortunate that South Africa has, 
through its enactment of information-centric legislation, fulfilled accepted criteria on political 
rights and civil liberties,182 but has simultaneously allowed a subversion of its democratic 
processes183 due to a lack of effective transparency policies.  
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CHAPTER 3  
PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT  
3.1. Introduction: 
In the context of the political culture of South Africa presented in the previous chapter and the 
challenge presented to hard-won political freedoms by secrecy in relation to party funding, the 
question needs to be asked: what is the prescription? Offering citizens access to information 
has been held to be one of the most effective ways of upholding the constitutional values of 
transparency, openness, participation and accountability.184 Flowing from this, it has been 
specifically held that information about the private funding of political parties is essential for 
the informed exercise of the right to vote that section 19(3) of the Bill of Rights confers.185 
Access to information is not only seen as being fundamental to a properly functioning 
participatory democracy, but it is also recognised as an entitlement which is able to increase 
public confidence in the government and enhance its legitimacy.186 In providing for access to 
information, section 32(2) of the Constitution directs that national legislation be enacted to give 
effect to the broad objective of the entitlement. However, as Calland observes, despite its 
constitutional obligations, South Africa has not yet cast off its historical tendency towards 
secrecy.187 This is so despite section 32, the PAIA and a plethora of other information-centric 
legislation. It is for this reason that the PAIA, as the principal statute intended to facilitate 
access to information, has been held to be invalid and unconstitutional188 to the extent that it 
fails to facilitate access to information on the private funding of political parties. In making 
this declaration, the Constitutional Court held that  
‘Information on the private funding of political parties and independent 
candidates is essential for the effective exercise of the right to make political 
choices and to participate in the elections … therefore PAIA is rendered 
inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that it fails to provide for the 
recordal, preservation and reasonable disclosure of information on the private 
funding of political parties and independent candidates’.189  
 
184 C Hoexter ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ (2012) 2ed Juta 94. 
185 My Vote Counts 1 at 2.  
186 Hoexter (n 184) at 94. 
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http://www.foip.saha.org.za/static/paper-wars-access-to-information-in-south-africa (accessed 10 September 
2018) 1. See also My Vote Counts 1 para 37. 
188 An amendment to the PAIA was published in GN R. 630 of 3 June 2020 published in Government Gazette 
43388 of 3 June 2020 (The Promotion of Access to Information Amendment Act 31 of 2019). 
189 My Vote Counts 2 order. 
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This chapter examines how the PAIA has fallen short of its constitutional mandate.190 
3.2. The Constitutional right of access to information and political party funding  
The inclusion of the right of access to information in the Interim Constitution was seen as an 
innovation of great significance191 given the apartheid government’s obsession with official 
secrecy.192 In one of the earliest cases to deal with this right, Jones J held:  
‘The purpose of section 23 is to exclude the perpetuation of the old system of 
administration, a system in which it was possible for government to escape 
accountability by refusing to disclose information even if it had a bearing upon 
the exercise or protection of rights of the individual. This is the mischief it is 
designed to prevent. [...] Demonstrable fairness and openness promotes public 
confidence in the administration of public affairs generally. This confidence is 
one of the characteristics of the democratically governed society for which the 
Constitution strives’.193  
There was therefore a need to foster a culture of transparency and accountability in public and 
private bodies and to promote a society in which people were able to exercise and protect all 
their rights.194 To achieve this, the right of access to information is divided into two distinct 
parts195 namely: 
(1) Everyone has the right of access to –  
(a) any information held by the state; and 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights. 
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide 
for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on 
the state.  
 
The PAIA is the principal legislation created196 by section 32(2) and mirrors the entitlements 
provided for in sections 32(1)(a) and (b). However, despite the enactment of the PAIA there 
has been little information in the public domain about the passage of money within the political 
 
190 See My Vote Counts 1 at 94 where the court found that the PAIA’s mechanisms and processes were 
inherently limited and not capable of affording citizens their right to be properly informed about political 
parties’ funding. 
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system. What we do know is that South African political parties enjoy no less than three sources 
of funding: the first stems from public funds, the second from a standing rule of Parliament197 
and the third from private sources.198 While the allocation of public funds is publicised, how 
and on what political parties spend this money remains largely unknown. Furthermore, there is 
no information on the private funds that political parties receive and there has, until recently 
been no mechanisms to facilitate this fundamental disclosure requirement. Recognising this 
insufficiency, the Constitutional Court held that:  
‘In a democratic society such as our own, the effective exercise of the right to 
vote also depends on the right of access to information. For without access to 
information, the ability of citizens to make responsible political decisions and 
participate meaningfully in public life is undermined’.199  
A year later, the court in Ramakatsa went further to tie political party affairs to their public 
nature by surmising that ‘public resources are directed at political parties for the very reason 
that they are the veritable vehicles the Constitution has chosen for facilitating and entrenching 
democracy’.200 This reasoning was developed three years later in the same court when Cameron 
J held in his minority judgment that:  
‘Ramakatsa’s reasoning on the public funding of political parties applies 
pointedly to the question whether information about parties’ private funding is 
required for the right to vote. Political parties receive public resources because 
they are the vehicles the Constitution has chosen for facilitating and entrenching 
democracy. This entails a corollary: that the private funds that they receive 
necessarily also have a distinctly public purpose, the enhancement and 
entrenchment of democracy as well as a public effect on whether democracy is 
indeed enhanced and entrenched. The flow of funds to political parties, public or 
private, is inextricably tied to their pivotal role in our country’s democratic 
functioning. There is a further corollary: given the parties’ emphatically public 
role, any notion of privacy attaching to their private funding must be significantly 
attenuated’.201  
Cameron J further acknowledges that ‘the right to vote is a right to cast an informed vote’.202 
It does not exist in a vacuum; it consists of more than making a cross on a ballot paper. It is a 
right which requires ‘one to vote knowingly for a party and its principles and programmes. It 
 
197 S 57(2)(c) and section 116(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
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is a right to vote for a political party knowing how it will contribute to constitutional democracy 
and the attainment of constitutional goals’.203  
The right of access to information is therefore seen as a conduit for civic engagement and state 
accountability. The PAIA, which is geared to facilitate this right, was held to have two material 
faults. The first was that it provided for ‘request based access’; therefore, absent a request, there 
is no obligation on the holder of information to make this information available. Secondly, the 
PAIA possessed a two-pronged approach that made no room for information requests from 
hybrid institutions, like political parties, as they are neither created by legislation nor required 
by any legislation to be juristic persons.204 Therefore, to the extent that they do not provide for 
their legal personality in their constitutions, the PAIA was not applicable to them.205 As a result 
of this, the PAIA was held to be inconsistent with the Constitution. This declaration of 
invalidity followed on a more than decade long litigious journey which commenced with a 
desire to build a mandate, out of section 32, for the disclosure of political party’s private 
funding.206  
3.2.1. Institute for Democracy in South Africa & Others v African National Congress  
 and others 2005 (5) SA 39 (C) 
This case ‘positioned civil society squarely against political parties in testing the ambit of the 
PAIA’207 as it was the first litigious effort by interested parties to try to gain access to the 
records of donations made to political parties.208 The applicants launched this application after 
previous attempts to obtain information from the political party respondents209 on their private 
donation records had failed.210 The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were 
obliged in terms of section 32(1) of the Constitution, read with sections 11 and 50 of the PAIA, 
to give access, on due and proper request, to their financial records.211 The application was 
based on section 32(1) and was limited to seeking disclosure in respect of donations that were 
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sufficiently substantial, current and capable of influencing and having an effect on a political 
party, its office-bearers and its members.212  
The court found that the issue was whether the applicants were entitled, in terms of the statutory 
provisions relied on, to the specific records claimed.213 The court first determined whether or 
not the applicants were entitled to invoke the constitutional provisions of section 32 directly, 
or whether their remedy was confined to the provisions of the PAIA.214 Observing the principle 
of subsidiarity, (an approach adopted and described in a subsequent judgment),215 the court 
held that ‘section 32, while providing the underlying basis for and informing the rights 
contained in PAIA, was subsumed by PAIA’216 and therefore the applicants had to seek their 
remedy within the four corners of the PAIA, unless its constitutionality was itself in issue.217 
To hold otherwise, the court continued, would encourage the development of ‘two parallel 
systems’218 which would go against the Constitutional Assembly’s ideal of having one 
intervening framework to give effect to the right of access to information. Operating from the 
premise that the remedy sought had to be found within the PAIA itself, the court then delved 
into the legal nature of political parties in order to determine the correct request procedure 
under the PAIA’s two-pronged request procedure. Mirroring the wording of section 32, the 
PAIA contains two request procedures, namely section 18 which deals with the procedure for 
requesting information from public bodies and section 53 which deals with the information 
request procedure for information in private institutions. The court found this distinction to be 
of significance as, if the respondents were found to be private bodies, the applicants would then 
have to overcome the additional hurdle of establishing that the donation records were required 
for the exercise or protection of rights.219  
Unconvinced by the applicants’ submissions regarding the legal personality of political parties 
in which the applicants tried to define them as public entities, the court held that in receiving 
donations political parties were private entities which exercised common law powers which, 
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subject to the relevant fundraising legislation, were open to any person in South Africa.220 This 
conclusion necessitated a further inquiry which was to examine whether the applicants, in terms 
of sections 19(1) and (2) of the Constitution, reasonably required the respondents’ donation 
records in order to exercise or protect their right to make political choices.221 In deciding this 
point, the court found that the applicants did not reasonably require any of the records in 
question for the proper exercise or protection of any of the rights claimed.222 The court held 
that the phrase ‘reasonably required’ should be understood to connote a substantial advantage 
or an element of need and not absolute necessity. The test for need was objective223 and 
according to the court, the applicants had failed to show how the respondent’s donation records 
would assist them in exercising and protecting any of the section 19 rights or why, absent these 
donation records, they were unable to exercise those rights.224 The court incorrectly, in my 
opinion, concluded that disclosure of donor funding was not a prerequisite to free and fair 
elections,225 but recognised the public interest in greater transparency concerning political 
parties’ funding sources.226 This, the court amplified by stating that ‘[t]he abovementioned 
conclusion does not mean that political parties should not, as a matter of principle, be 
compelled to disclose details of private donations made to their coffers. It merely means that, 
on my interpretation of existing legislation, the respondents are not obliged to disclose such 
records’.227 
This case highlighted the strictures that the PAIA lent itself to, especially considering the 
entitlements it is intended to facilitate. It exposed the PAIA’s limited reach and impracticality 
in facilitating general and systematic access to information.  Most notably though, the case 
‘laid the basis for the court to promote a nuanced and purposive interpretation of the PAIA’228 
which we see play out below.  
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3.2.2. My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT121/14) 
[2015] ZACC 31  
The applicant in this case adopted an approach similar to the one in IDASA, relying on 
section 32 of the Constitution to give proper effect to the right contained in section 19(3).229 
The applicant invoked the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court230 and asserted that 
information about political party private funding was essential to an informed exercise of the 
enshrined political right.231 The applicant further contended that the problem was precisely that 
the PAIA did not require disclosure of party political funding232 and that for this reason 
Parliament should be compelled to pass legislation that obliged political parties to disclose the 
sources of their private funding. This application sought to compel the enactment of legislation 
regulating the disclosure of private funding records as a matter of continuous course, rather 
than as a once-off upon request,233 as is the case currently under the PAIA. The relief the 
applicant sought was not contemplated in the PAIA itself, but in section 32 and the applicant 
required that the court interpret the ambit of the section 32(1) right and the extent to which 
Parliament had fulfilled its obligations under section 32(2). 
Cameron J, for the minority, held that the specific question was whether information on the 
private funding of political parties was information that was required to exercise the right to 
vote. If it was, then the further question was whether Parliament had passed legislation that 
gave effect to this right.234 Relying on existing precedents235 he found that the information on 
political parties’ private funding was required for the proper exercise of the right contained in 
section 19 and further that Parliament had failed to pass legislation that gave effect to this right. 
He held, therefore, that the issue was not the validity of the PAIA, but whether Parliament had 
adequately fulfilled its obligations in terms of section 32.236 This, the minority concluded, 
required an assessment of the reach, and not necessarily the validity, of existing access to 
information legislation.237 The minority further concluded that this assessment could be 
achieved by ‘invoking the Constitution to gauge the extent to which legislation meets the 
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constitutional obligation’.238 The PAIA had failed because it did not define ‘information’239 
and only defined ‘record’, thereby limiting the operation of the Act to that which was defined 
and excluding anything which wasn’t.240 Coupled with this, the PAIA created no obligation for 
the preservation of recorded information and, as such, rendered the application of the Act 
reactive.241 Most pertinently, the court concluded that the PAIA failed because records could 
only be requested from private or public bodies,242 thus excluding all entities whose legal 
personality did not fall within these constrictions. The PAIA was therefore unable to facilitate 
the disclosure of information regarding the funding of political parties and this, the minority 
found, was a context with unique demands to which the PAIA failed to address itself243 and 
this mischief ought to be corrected without putting form over substance.   
The majority of the court disagreed with the minority finding that ‘Parliament had failed to 
fulfil its constitutional obligation to enact the legislation envisaged in section 32(2)’.244 The 
majority considered the issues of  
1. Exclusive jurisdiction;  
2. Whether the PAIA was the legislation envisaged in section 32(2) of the Constitution;  
3. Separation of powers;  
4. Circumstances in which the principle of subsidiarity applies and the need for it; and  
5. Whether the applicant had challenged the constitutional validity of the PAIA. 
Exclusive jurisdiction having been decided245 in the affirmative, the court then turned its 
attention to the wording of section 32 of the Constitution, the long title, the preamble and 
section 9 of the PAIA together with the dicta in inter alia Independent 
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Newspapers,246Brummer247 and PFE International248 to find that there was no doubt that the 
PAIA was the legislation envisaged by section 32(2) and the fact that ‘it might have 
shortcomings in its protection of the right and possibly even be constitutionally invalid does 
not alter this legal reality’.249 The PAIA was the legislation envisaged by the Constitution and 
the applicant could not dictate to Parliament how the PAIA should read250 as this would offend 
against the principle of separation of powers. Any shortcomings complained of within the 
PAIA were best to be dealt with by a frontal challenge to the PAIA. To the extent that this had 
not happened, the principle of subsidiarity was breached.251 Simply put, the court held that 
subsidiarity was a well-established doctrine in South African law which states that ‘where 
legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right, a litigant should rely on that legislation in 
order to give effect to the right or alternatively challenge the legislation as being inconsistent 
with the Constitution’.252 Mirroring the reasoning in IDASA, the court held that ‘allowing 
reliance directly on constitutional rights, in defiance of their statutory embodiment, would 
encourage the development of “two parallel systems of law”’.253 The court held that the 
applicant’s failure to challenge the PAIA rendered the application, at least on the merits, moot 
and the application was dismissed. 
3.2.3. My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and another 
2018 (5) SA 380 (CC)  
The trilogy of cases in the access to political information melee ends with a recognition of the 
insufficiency of the PAIA in facilitating, in particular, the entitlements of section 19. In this 
case, as proposed by the majority judgment in the preceding case, a frontal challenge to the 
constitutional validity of the PAIA was launched in the Western Cape High Court.254 The 
applicant contended that, properly understood, section 32 read with sections 19 and 7(2) of the 
Constitution required Parliament to pass legislation that provided for the recordal and 
disclosure of information about the private funding of political parties and independent 
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candidates; and the PAIA, being the legislation passed to fulfil this obligation, had failed to do 
so.255 The High Court, relying heavily on the minority judgment in My Vote Counts I, held that 
in terms of sections 19(1), 19(3), 32 and 7(2) of the Constitution information about the private 
funding of political parties and independent ward candidates was reasonably required for the 
effective exercise of the right to vote and, to the extent that the PAIA did not allow for the 
recordal and disclosure of this information, it was inconsistent with the Constitution and 
invalid. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered three pertinent issues. The first was 
whether the Constitution required disclosure of private funding; if it did whether the 
PAIA allowed for the disclosure of the private funding of political parties, as is required under 
s 32(1) of the Constitution, and whether or not the PAIA was unconstitutional.  
These issues were decided systematically by the court probing, in each instance, the substance 
of the issues. In deciding the first issue, the court considered the wording of section 32 and 
held that there was no restriction on who could access information and similarly, the concept 
of information that was held was suggestive of information that was known or current.256  
Therefore, the interdependency created by section 32(2) meant that section 32 had to be read 
together with section 19 in order to determine what the Constitution required.257 The court 
having established that the right in section 19(3), was among the rights contemplated in section 
32(1)(b) and that the term ‘required’ meant ‘reasonably required’,258 found that ‘the unique 
nature of political parties and their influential role has a significant bearing on whence and 
from whom their funds derive’259 and as such, information about their private funding was 
required for the exercise and protection of the right to vote. Following this conclusion, the court 
had to consider whether the PAIA allowed for the disclosure of party funding information. 
After considering the circumstances under which information can be requested under the PAIA, 
the court found that the PAIA’s mechanisms and processes were inherently limited and not in 
sync with section 32 and, as a result, limited this section.260 This conclusion necessitated an 
enquiry whether this limitation was reasonable and justifiable as contemplated in section 36. 
In answer, the court found that the right to privacy could be justifiably attenuated as privacy 
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operated truly in a personal realm, and as one moved into business and social interactions, the 
scope of personal space shrank.261  Therefore, ‘given the public nature of political parties and 
the fact that the private funds they receive [serve] a distinctly public purpose’, the limitation 
imposed by the PAIA on section 32 was not reasonable and justifiable. Tying all these issues 
together, the court held that the PAIA was unconstitutional and invalid insofar as it did not 
allow for the disclosure of private funding of political parties as required by section 32(1) for 
the effective exercise of the right to vote and make political choices. 
Following the declaration of invalidity by the High Court, the matter was referred to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation.262 The court observed that making information 
reasonably accessible to voters in terms of the PAIA was a laborious procedure.263 The court 
found, as proposed by Currie and Klaaren,264 that the PAIA was firstly under-inclusive265 in 
that it did not go far enough in its coverage; and secondly the Act was limited as its provisions 
and procedures permitting and restricting access to information were too onerous and 
restrictive.266 The court further noted that it did not help much that this crucial information 
could only be freely accessible at the discretion of the respondent Minister. Reasonable access, 
the court held, should be institutionalised267 and the ease with which information was made 
accessible ought to depend on the nature of the right whose exercise or protection was sought 
to be facilitated. The right to vote was one such example. It was intrinsic to its proper enjoyment 
and its essentiality that all information be recorded and be easily or reasonably accessible.268 
For these reasons the PAIA was held to fall short of its constitutional mandate.  
3.3. Conclusion: 
Access to information is not only fundamental to a properly functioning participatory 
democracy, but also serves to increase public confidence in government and enhances its 
legitimacy.269 As found by the Constitutional Court, ‘the architectural design of the nation’s 
constitutional democracy requires that leaders must first be elected by the populace before any 
of them, including the head of state, may be elected by fellow members in legislative bodies to 
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become leading constitutional office-bearers’.270 The PAIA fails to honour this ‘architectural 
design’ because it affords only the right to gain access, upon specific request, to specific records 
held by specific bodies at specific times.271 The upshot was, as the minority held in My Vote 
Counts 1, that ‘the private contributions, and their amount and provenance, could be left 
unrecorded – and therefore incapable of being requested in terms of PAIA’.272 This, together 
with the narrow pairwise relationship the PAIA envisaged between individual requesters and 
individual entities holding the records, whose disclosure is compelled only upon application, 
means that it cannot fulfil the demand of section 19(3), or the promise of section 32.273 The 
PAIA, despite being the law upholding transparency, offends, in its current form, the 
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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXTS 
4.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters illustrated the importance of promoting access to information through 
the development of adequate regulatory regimes in the fight against corruption. This regulation 
pivots on regulating the passage of private funds to and through political coffers. The previous 
chapter demonstrated how easily transparency frameworks create unintended strictures, 
contradicting their intent. Being a global phenomenon, the fight against corruption has 
necessitated a collective approach, which according to international law, comprises ‘a body of 
rules established by custom or treaty and recognized by nations as binding in their relations 
with one another’.274 International law instruments place a positive duty on state parties to 
adopt measures which incorporate principles of transparency and access to information in an 
effort to root out illegal, corrupt and illicit practices. This chapter reviews the international 
legal and political contexts applicable in the fight against corruption.  
In Glenister275 the court held that ‘our Constitution takes into its very heart obligations to which 
the Republic, through the solemn resolution of Parliament, has acceded, and which are binding 
on the Republic in international law, and makes them the measure of the state’s conduct in 
fulfilling its obligations in relation to the Bill of Rights’.276 Governments’ ratification of anti-
corruption international law instruments which require the adoption of laws, policies and 
practices to detect and deter actual or perceived corruption reflects acquiescence with the need 
to fight this most debilitating scourge. This was aptly stated in My Vote Counts (WCC) where 
it was surmised that ‘the nexus between corruption and political donations has already been 
accepted by Parliament by its ratification of these conventions, and South Africa has an 
obligation to honour them’.277 Glenister further confirms that:  
‘The obligations in these Conventions are clear and they are unequivocal. They impose 
on the Republic the duty in international law to create an anti-corruption unit that has 
the necessary independence. That duty exists not only in the international sphere and is 
enforceable not only there. Our Constitution appropriates the obligation itself, and 
draws it deeply into its heart, by requiring the state to fulfil it in the domestic sphere.’278 
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International law recognises that transparency and openness, especially in the fight against 
corruption, are crucial to gaining and maintaining citizens’ trust in government. Among other 
things, transparency helps create fairness of opportunity by exposing and punishing undue 
influence over politicians, protecting against the infiltration of illicit money into politics, and 
encouraging parties and candidates to adhere to the rules.279 As Chaskalson J held: ‘[t]he 
international and foreign authorities are of value because they analyse arguments for and 
against and show how other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue. For that reason alone, they 
require our attention.’280  
Regular elections involving competing political parties and movements have become the 
dominant method of selecting a government.281 Funding, with no reciprocal obligation, is 
crucial to the overall vibrancy of an electoral and democratic system.282 Genuinely competitive 
democratic politics is not possible without well-functioning and socially embedded parties.283 
In order to function, political parties require substantial financial resources. However, because 
these parties contest for public power, it is a natural expectation that those who donate money 
to political parties expect and are sometimes promised and even given favourable treatment in 
political decisions.284 It is therefore essential for every well-functioning democracy to develop 
a party funding regime that is capable of at least reasonably mitigating the threat of corruption 
in this crucial area.285 Regulation is seen as the first of many vital steps in mitigating the effects 
of corruption, and to this end a number of guidelines have been published to guide states in 
their regulatory endeavours. 
4.2. International Law instruments 
South Africa is considered bound at international level by agreements ratified by Parliament286 
and is therefore obliged to accede to the instructions thereby prescribed. International law is 
defined as  
‘that body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of 
conduct which States feel themselves bound to observe, and therefore, do commonly 
observe in their relations with each other and which includes also: (a) the rules of law 
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relating to the functioning of international institutions or organisations, their relations 
with each other, and their relations with States and individuals; and (b) certain rules 
relating to individuals and non-State entities so far as the rights or duties of such 
individuals and non-State entities are the concern of the international community’.287 
The international law which must be considered includes agreements to which South Africa is 
not a party, and other norms of international law not binding on South Africa.288 The 
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane289 held that: 
‘International agreements and customary international law provide a framework 
within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that 
purpose decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and in appropriate 
cases, reports of specialised agencies … may provide guidance as to the correct 
interpretation of particular provisions’.290   
The following instruments, to which South Africa is a signatory, comprise our international 
law obligations: United Nations Convention against Corruption,291 UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime,292 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption,293 and Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption.294 
Other international instruments which may be consulted include the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,295 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,296 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights297 and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development: Convention on Combating of Foreign Public Officials in 
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4.2.1. Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (15 May 
2003) 
The Southern African Development Community Protocol (SADC Corruption Protocol) 
provides codes of procedure and practice on various issues, as agreed by member states.299 The 
protocol refers to ‘the adverse and destabilizing effects of corruption throughout the world on 
the culture, economic, social and political foundations of society’ and recognises that 
‘corruption undermines good governance, which includes the principles of accountability and 
transparency’.300 The protocol prescribes in article 2 that ‘each state party shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures under its domestic law to prevent and combat acts of corruption 
committed in and by private sector entities’.301 The significance of this provision to South 
Africa’s unique political system lies in the fact that whilst South African political parties are 
neither considered to be private nor public entities, the Constitutional Court has held that ‘any 
notion of privacy attaching to their private funding must be significantly attenuated’302 because 
‘[t]he flow of funds to political parties, public or private, is inextricably tied to their pivotal 
[public] role in our country’s democratic functioning’.303 
Article 4 of the protocol details preventative measures that should be adopted in order to deter 
corruption by, inter alia, adopting mechanisms to promote access to information in order to 
facilitate the eradication and elimination of opportunities for corruption.304  
4.2.2. United Nations Convention against Corruption (22 November 2004)  
The United Nations Convention (UN Convention) against corruption is a far-reaching measure, 
and the mandatory character of many of its provisions make it a unique tool for developing a 
comprehensive response to this global problem.305 Under international law, freedom of 
information is a fundamental human right and the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the 
United Nations is dedicated.306 
Article 5(1) of the UN Convention provides that:  
‘Each State Party shall in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal 
system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption 
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policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the 
rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, 
transparency and accountability’.  
Article 7(3) provides that:  
‘Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this convention and in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to enhance 
transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where 
applicable, the funding of political parties’. 
Article 7(4) directs that ‘each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles 
of its domestic law, endeavour to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that promote 
transparency and prevent conflicts of interest’. The UN Convention places transparency at the 
centre of the fight against corruption and recognises the importance of promoting citizen 
participation in issues that affect public affairs.  
4.2.3. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption  
(11 November 2005) 307 
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention on 
Corruption) represents a consensus on what African countries should do in the areas of 
prevention and criminalisation of corruption.308 The preamble to the AU Convention on 
Corruption acknowledges that ‘corruption undermines accountability and transparency in the 
management of public affairs as well as socio-economic development on the continent’.309 
Article 10 of the AU Convention provides that ‘each State Party shall adopt legislative and 
other measures to: 
(a) Proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to 
 finance political parties; and  
(b) Incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties. 
 
Article 9 provides that each state party shall adopt such legislative and other measures to give 
effect to the right of access to any information that is required to assist in the fight against 
corruption and related offences.  
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These instruments, which are binding on South Africa, illustrate the belief that suffrage and 
political participation are fundamental human rights which can only be protected through 
appropriate measures that promote transparency and accountability. There is therefore a clear 
obligation, at international level, on states to adopt legislative measures that promote and 
enhance transparency and public participation through access to information, in the funding of 
politics. 
4.3 The International political economy and the party funding narrative 
One of the main factors impeding the political process in many countries from attaining 
democratic ideals is the influence of money.310 Thus awareness has gradually been building 
that organising well-administered elections does nothing for democracy if the outcome is 
bankrolled.311 Political finance poses global challenges and, in an attempt to address these 
challenges, most countries now have at least some form of regulation over the passage of 
money within the political system.312 No set of rules will be effective in any two countries,313 
and there is therefore no universally accepted regulatory regime mainly because political party 
funding systems are largely influenced by political history and the electoral system in place.314  
The Council of Europe has set standards to guide its members towards finding their own 
answers to the party funding dilemma. Without prescribing an ideal model, countries are urged 
to adopt rules which ensure an equal and fair opportunity for all parties competing in the 
political arena and guaranteeing their independence.315 Political finance reforms are largely 
ineffective if they are not ‘conscientiously enforced as part of the broader governance and 
ethics framework’.316 The legal framework of party financing includes, where applicable, 
constitutional provisions, locally enacted laws on political parties and laws on the financing of 
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Countries would benefit from written laws as opposed to customary law or administrative 
policies in governing the financing of political parties and the conduct of candidates and 
election campaigns, as written law is more readily subject to judicial interpretation and review 
and is more useful to interested parties, especially voters.318 The legal framework adopted 
should be objective, clear, transparent and publicly accessible.319 In regulating political finance, 
legislation should also cover the fundamental matters of traditional sources of finance, private 
donations, public subsidies to political parties, the financing of election campaigns and 
provisions for disclosure, reporting, monitoring and enforcement.320 It is important that 
legislation is adopted which counteracts (i) the imbalance in opportunities for political 
participation, (ii) competition generated by unequal access to private donations, and (iii) the 
potentially corrupting effects of private funding.321 
According to the Framework for Supporting Better Public Policies and Averting Policy Capture 
(Framework),322 money is a necessary component of the democratic process, and if the 
financing of political parties and electoral campaigns is not adequately regulated and the rules 
enforced, money becomes a means for undue influence and policy capture by narrow 
interests.323 According to the Framework, the overall objective is to promote a ‘level playing 
field’ and ensure transparency and accountability, and this can be achieved by:324  
1) Balancing funding through direct and indirect public contributions. In this regard, it 
is imperative to have clear and equitable criteria relating to access and 
proportionality. 
2) Framing private funding by inter alia, banning and/or limiting certain types of private 
contributions. 
3) Limiting privileged access to state resources by controlling the use of state resources;  
4) Requiring disclosures in the form on timeous and comprehensive reporting which 
will enable scrutiny from both civil society, observers and the media;  
5) Creating a platform for the independence of monitoring bodies and processes;  
6) Providing for dissuasive and enforceable sanctions; and  
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A study of the relevant literature, which is by no means exhaustive, prescriptive or binding, 
and an examination of how foreign jurisdictions, against the backdrop of their international 
obligations, have fashioned regulatory regimes, indicates that the generally accepted criteria 
for selecting the best practice can be summarised as follows: 
4.3.1. Balancing competing considerations: 
In regulating the permissible sources of party funding, lawmakers (MPs) weigh and balance a 
number of different and sometimes competing considerations.325 For example, in considering 
the different submissions in IDASA, the court had to consider the right of privacy enjoyed by 
donors juxtaposed with the right of access to information, as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Many jurisdictions have, in an effort to limit reciprocity, attenuated the various sources of 
funding. This is done, in some cases, by prohibiting foreign and anonymous donations. The 
problems of vote buying appear to be particularly profound in many transitional and 
consolidating democracies where the political process more broadly tends to be dominated by 
‘particularistic exchanges’.326 In those democracies, caps on individual and corporate donations 
seem to be a viable prescription.327 Restrictions commonly apply to corporate donations due to 
the porous nature of their funds and, although private business remains an important source of 
finance, some countries328 have moved towards more stringent legislative frameworks on 
corporate donations in an attempt to limit the influence of ‘plutocratic financing’ of democratic 
politics.329 This limitation often tends to apply to donations from foreign governments as well, 
as these have been found to lead to policy capture.  
4.3.2 Limitations on spending 
Unlimited spending creates an unfair disadvantage for some parties, in that parties with 
wealthier voters may simply drown out the voice of political actors representing less wealthy 
social groups.330 Capping campaign-related expenditure may have the benefit of reducing the 
demand for political donations, and thus also the possibility of quid pro quo and reliance on 
potentially risky sources of funding.331 Therefore, an ideal campaign finance regime will cap 
spending at some level that is high enough to allow for vigorous competition, but that is at the 
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same time low enough to protect equality of opportunity and to reduce the risk of corruption.332 
In some counties, spending limits are controversial because they are seen as imposing 
restrictions on the freedom of speech.333 However, most democracies have leaned towards 
more restrictive regulations334 as these tend to have a more positive effect on governance.   
Restrictions on campaign expenditure are accepted on the grounds that unrestricted spending 
gives an unfair advantage to interests with privileged access to financial resources, and might 
make elected officials dependent on their economic contributors at the expense of the  
general interests of the population at large.335 The Canadian Supreme Court ruled in  
Harper v Canada336 that ‘spending limits are justified with a view to preventing the most 
affluent citizens from monopolizing the electoral discourse’.337 Limits on party and campaign 
expenditure are a device to avoid excessive increases in the cost of party politics. They also 
help to control inequalities between political parties and restrict the scope of improper influence 
and corruption.338  
If a limit in force only applies to the amount of money an individual donor may contribute, 
rather than to the total sum of the permissible private donations, then wealthy contributors 
might divide up a large donation into various smaller ones,339 thereby circumventing the very 
purpose of the limit. Therefore, in order to ensure equality of opportunity for the different 
political forces, electoral campaign expenses should have a fixed ceiling.340 As with donation 
limits, the effectiveness of spending limits depends both on whether the limit is set at the right 
level to curb the advantage for those with access to a lot of money without hindering inclusive 
and engaging campaigning.341 In the same way that private funding drowns out the voice of 
 
332 Ibid.  
333 Van Biezen op cit (n 315) at 5 where she explains that the United States is known for having privileged the 
freedom of speech and represents a particularly permissive tradition with regard to campaign expenditure, as 
spending by candidates is not limited, with the exception of presidential candidates who voluntarily accept 
spending limits in exchange for public subsidies. She goes on to explain that the US Supreme Court ruled in 
Buckley v Valeo that expenditure ceilings impose direct and substantial restraints on … political speech, thus 
deeming expenditure limits unconstitutional and in violation of the First Amendment.  
334 Van Biezen op cit (n 315) at 5 explains that the European approach has been to justify restrictions on 
campaign expenditures as a means to control the potential disruptive role of money in politics.  
335 Ibid. 
336 Harper v Canada (AG) [2004] 1 S.C.R 827, 2004 SCC 33. 
337 Van Biezen op cit (n 315) at 5. See also Harper v Canada as this judgment has been seen as representing a 
more egalitarian approach to political finance.  
338 Van Biezen op cit (n 315) at 29. 
339 Ibid at 22. 
340 Ibid at 30.  
341 Falguera op cit (n 279) at 27. 
45 
 
those with limited coffers, uncapped spending drowns out the campaign efforts of smaller 
political parties. 
4.3.3. Transparency, Access to Information and Oversight: 
The basis of any policy regulating political finance would be for the beneficiaries in the 
political process to submit information about how they raise and spend money.342 Transparency 
requirements seek to enhance political accountability by providing insight into the actual levels 
of income and expenditure.343 Much depends on the ability, competence and willingness of 
particular regulators and agency officials to adequately perform their duties.344 The agencies 
responsible for oversight and enforcement should have some degree of independence from the 
executive and legislative branches of government, so as to diminish influence from the very 
elected officials whose parties they are obliged to oversee.345 There are also some advantages 
inherent in having multiple agencies exercising oversight and enforcement, each acting on its 
own and independent of one another.346 However the best practice appears to lie in having 
multiple oversight mechanisms for different branches of government,347 precisely because the 
different levels of government are self-governing.  
4.3.4 Enforcement and sanctions 
Party finance regimes operate as integrated systems, and for this reason the question of sources 
of funding and of various limits applicable to spending by parties require adequate 
enforcement.348 Formal rules alone do not have a significant impact. Dedicated work by 
numerous stakeholders is required to manage the role of money in politics. Reformers must 
emphasise how political finance regulations can be effectively implemented.349 Effective 
enforcement requires a public institution with a clear mandate and sufficient independence, 
resources and a willingness to engage with political finance issues.350 However, given that rules 
are inevitably broken, it is equally important that transgressions are met with adequate 
sanctions, because sanctions serve to deter evasion or violation of the rules. An effective system 
of enforcement demands that these requirements are embedded in a context of legal sanctions 
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which impose penalties for violations of the law.351 Sanctions should be heavy enough to deter 
violations,352 but excessively heavy-handed sanctions are rarely enforced and therefore do not 
represent credible threats to violators.353 The best approach may be to rank violations from 
serious to minor,354 with enforceable, proportionate, effective and dissuasive sanctions,355 the 
lack of which can discredit the rule of law and the regulatory regime.356  
4.4 Conclusion 
While money is necessary for democratic politics, it can also be a tool to buy votes or influence 
policy decisions.357 The need to regulate uncontrolled, undisclosed and opaque political finance 
was identified by the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security as important 
in upholding the integrity of elections in both emerging and mature democracies.358 However, 
too often political finance regulations are reactive measures for crisis situations, focusing on a 
particular regulation rather than a more holistic consideration of broader issues, such as the role 
of political parties and election candidates.359 Nevertheless, the need for transparency in the 
role of money in politics cannot be overstated, and it is for this reason that international law 
focuses primarily on law enforcement strategies in the fight against corruption.360 While there 
is no universally acceptable model upon which to premise regulation, international law 
obligations prescribe, at a minimum, the advancement of transparency and openness together 
with formalised regulatory institutions with sufficient resources, expertise and independence.  
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POLITICAL PARTY FUNDING ACT 6 of 2018 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the obligations imposed by international law for the regulation 
of political party funding while highlighting some facets of the party funding narrative. 
Countries, including South Africa, increasingly appreciate the need for legal frameworks to 
regulate political finance, and in response to its constitutional and international obligations, 
Parliament has passed, and the President has assented361 to, the Political Party Funding Act, 6 
of 2018. This chapter assesses whether the Act’s provisions adequately address the problems 
associated with party funding, particularly the threat of corruption. 
The legislature recognises that public confidence in Parliament requires disclosure by Members 
of Parliament of their financial interests,362 and has adopted a Code which deals with the issue 
of conflicts of interest between their work as representatives of the South African electorate 
and their personal financial interests. In addition to a duty to disclose, the Code requires 
parliamentarians to resolve conflicts of interest in favour of the public interest.363 This is known 
as the public interest override, and Currie and Klaaren suggest that ‘where it does apply, the 
public interest override equals disclosure …’.364 This assertion relates mainly to refusals to 
disclose under the PAIA; however the recalcitrance that defines non-disclosure of political 
finance is analogous to a refusal under the PAIA and should have, without more, been able to 
trigger the public interest override. Instead however, the PAIA was declared unconstitutional 
and an intervening framework has been adopted.  
Sections 1, 7, 19, 32, 33 and 195 of the Constitution require appropriate legislation to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the funding of political parties. Each provision imposes a 
specific obligation on Parliament to enact legislation to give effect to the duties, rights and 
principles365 enshrined therein. Vibrant, genuinely competitive democratic politics is not 
possible without well-functioning and socially embedded parties,366 which require substantial 
financial resources. Those who donate money to political parties tend to expect and are 
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sometimes promised and even given favourable treatment in political decisions.367 South 
Africa’s unique political culture, as outlined in chapter 2, illustrates that dominant-party 
politics is still greatly entrenched within the political fabric as a result of the racial cleavages 
of the past;368 and the ideal of a multi-party democracy exists mainly as an ideology, while 
access to political resources remains within the reach of a select few parties and individuals. 
This reality negates the founding provisions of the Constitution and section 236 which, read 
together, provide that ‘[t]o enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide 
for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an 
equitable and proportional basis’. The Political Party Funding Act (the Act) not only responds 
to the directive in sections 1(d) and 236 by facilitating a multi-party democracy, but it also 
assumes the responsibility of democratising the electoral system, balancing access to political 
resources, rooting out opportunities for corruption and giving effect to section 32.  
The Act represents a positive step towards acknowledging and promoting the values of 
transparency, openness, responsiveness and accountability, intending, as its long title suggests, 
to provide for and regulate the public and private funding of political parties, and in particular: 
• to establish and manage official Funds to sufficiently support political parties; 
• to prohibit certain donations made directly to political parties;  
• to regulate disclosure of donations accepted;  
• to determine the duties of political parties in respect of funding; to provide for powers 
and duties of the Electoral Commission; to provide for administrative fines;  
• to create offences and penalties; to repeal the Public Funding of Represented Political 
Parties Act, 1997; and  
• to provide for transitional and related matters.  
 
The preamble recognises the Republic’s public international law obligations, which require 
transparency in the funding of political parties; and in the process, Parliament has given effect 
to section 44369 of the Constitution by enacting legislation which regulates, in particular, private 
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5.2 An evaluation of the Political Party Funding Act 
The Political Party Funding Act was assented to on 21 January 2019, its date of commencement 
is yet to be proclaimed. Similarly, its regulations are still in draft form. Nevertheless, this thesis 
examines the Act’s sufficiency as: 
a) an anti-corruption framework which promotes access to information, transparency and 
accountability; and  
b) a legal framework which gives effect to the constitutional objectives contained in 
section 1(d), section 236 and section 19 of the Constitution.  
 
Holtes370 observes that:  
‘One of the key elements of disagreement is whether the … PAIA covers the 
entire field of section 32. This stems from the ambiguous nature of the phrase 
“national legislation must be enacted” which does not clearly indicate whether a 
single piece of legislation is envisaged or whether there might be a plurality of 
legislation which gives full effect to the right. Perhaps the constitutional drafters 
intentionally left the phrase ambiguous in order to allow Parliament to decide 
which approach would be more effective … Parliament has evidently decided 
that one Act will fulfil the obligation …. But on the other hand, the fact that PAIA 
is the legislation principally intended to honour the section 32(2) obligation does 
not necessarily mean it is the only legislation intended to give effect to the right 
(original author’s emphasis). Quite plainly, PAIA is the core legislation intended 
to facilitate the right. Meanwhile on the penumbra, gaps in providing access to 
information concerning specific rights might be filled by separate legislation 
where section 32 is not the central concern of that legislation’.371  
The Act represents an innovative intervening framework primarily intended to address political 
finance in response to the directive in section 236 read with sections 1(d), 32 and 19 of the 
Constitution. The Act commences with an acknowledgement that the Republic’s public 
international law obligations require it to incorporate the principle of transparency in the 
funding of political parties.372 Section 9 introduces this requirement by prescribing that ‘[a] 
political party must disclose to the Commission all donations received-  
(a) above the prescribed threshold;  
(b) in the prescribed form and manner.  
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Furthermore, juristic persons making donations above the prescribed threshold must disclose 
them to the [Independent Electoral] Commission.373 This dual reporting requirement acts as a 
further measure of ensuring the veracity of the information received by the Commission and 
also allows audits of to the books of the Commission to detect any reporting discrepancies. The 
Commission is further required to publish information of the donations disclosed to it, on a 
quarterly basis.374 While the Act does not exclude the application of the PAIA, it ensures that 
the PAIA’s request strictures are circumvented by requiring the Commission to make 
information readily available. As Bentley and Calland observe, the PAIA plays a valuable role 
because of its capacity to prompt the inversion of power relationships.375 
Apart from requiring disclosure of donations, the Act regulates the types of donations political 
parties may receive. The historical secrecy that attaches to political finance has made it possible 
for them to accept monetary assistance from any source. Under the Act, political parties may 
not accept donations from foreign governments or foreign government agencies,376 foreign 
persons or entities,377 organs of state378 or state-owned enterprises.379 The prohibition of receipt 
of monies from foreign sources is intended to safeguard the country’s domestic autonomy and 
sovereignty.380 However, it has also been argued that (foreign) party aid is of critical 
importance for transitional societies because it supports the existence of a viable opposition in 
a context of patronage-dominated politics.381 Given South Africa’s budgetary constraints, it is 
important to leave the way open for as many legitimate alternative sources of funding as 
possible. The Act could accommodate the receipt of foreign aid through one of the Funds 
established to avert policy capture − aimed mainly at promoting the ideal of a multi-party 
democracy. The Funds, generally, are responsible to hold money obtained in contravention of 
the provisions of the Act382 and interest earned on that money.383 The first Fund is the 
Represented Political Party Fund384 which is responsible for administering funds appropriated 
 
373 S 9(2). 
374 S 9(3)(a).  
375 Bentley K & Calland R ‘Access to Information and Socio-Economic Rights: A Theory of Change in 
Practice’ in Langford M, Cousins B, Dugard J & Madlingozi T’ (Eds), Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
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376 Section 8(1)(a). 
377 Section 8(1)(b) unless the donation is related to training or skills development of a member of a political 
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378 Section 8(1)(c). 
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384 S 2.  
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by an Act of Parliament;385 and the second Fund is the Multi-Party Democracy Fund386 which 
is responsible for administering funds appropriated from private sources.387  
The Multi-Party Democracy Fund is similar to the US PAC model388 through which funds from 
organs of state, state-owned enterprises and foreign governments and/or government agencies 
may not be received.389 While the Funds may not receive funds from the sources prohibited 
under section 8, they are tailored to accept anonymous donations,390 and the money held under 
this Fund may only be allocated to represented political parties391 in accordance with the 
prescribed formula, which makes provision for equitable and proportional representation. 
Democracies benefit from a public funding regime which encompasses an equitable formula 
of funding that does not disproportionately favour large parties.392 Ideally, the formula for 
allocation of funds should strive to achieve a 50/50 split between proportionality and equity.393  
Sections 7 and 7(2) provide for what the money allocated by the Fund may and may not be 
used for respectively. The latter includes paying any remuneration, fee, reward or benefit to 
any person representing a party at local, provincial or national level, or any person employed 
in the state,394 to finance or contribute to any matter, cause or event or occasion in contravention 
of any code of ethics binding on members of Parliament (MPs) or members of the provincial 
legislatures (MPLs),395 or to defray legal costs relating to internal political party disputes.396 
These limitations are novel in that placing restrictions on the use of money diminishes the need 
for excessive fundraising. This prohibition should ideally extend to political parties generally 
and not be limited to money received from the Funds.  
The prohibition of certain types of donations, ties in with the donation thresholds which, 
according to the draft regulations, are determined by regulation 9 of the presidential 
regulations. Donations may not be in excess of the prescribed amount in a particular financial 
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388 United States of America Political Action Committee which is a model which pools campaign contributions 
from members and donates those funds to campaigns for or against candidates, ballot initiatives and legislation. 
Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_action_committee (accessed 10 September 2018). 
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year397 and political parties are required to disclose to the Commission all donations received 
in excess of the prescribed amount in any given financial year.398 The obligation to disclose 
donations above a certain threshold rests both with the political party and the juristic entity 
donor.399 While donation and disclosure thresholds are favoured, the disclosure threshold limit 
should not be so high so as to exclude the corrupt activity at local government level or so low 
and strict as to impose an undue administrative burden that could erode the freedom of political 
organisations to operate freely.400 International trends suggest that an ideal campaign finance 
regime caps spending at a level that is high enough to allow for vigorous competition, but low 
enough to protect equality of opportunity and to reduce the risk of corruption.401  
Chapter 4 of the Act includes provision for the duties of political parties to furnish information 
to the Commission402 and to account for income.403 The information must be furnished at the 
prescribed time in the prescribed manner in order to enable to the Commission to monitor 
compliance with the Act.404 All funds received by political parties must be deposited into a 
bank account registered in the political party’s name405 and proper books of account and 
financial statements must be maintained by an accounting officer406 and audited by a qualified 
auditor,407 who will then provide an opinion on the party’s compliance with the prescripts of 
the Act.408 The Auditor-General is also empowered to audit any registered political party’s 
books and records of account and financial statements relating to money allocated by the 
Represented Political Party Fund.409 The office of the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
has raised concerns410 about its involvement as required by section 12(5).411 Apart from raising 
capacity issues, it is of the view that it is not clear whether the monies received by political 
parties from the Represented Political Parties Fund are intended for a public purpose as 
envisaged by section 188(2) of the Constitution because political parties are not accountable to 
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400 OSCE-ODIHR – Discussion paper on political party finance in Spain at 16. 
401 Fn 283 supra at 3 
402 S 11.  
403 S 12. 
404 S 11. 
405 S 12(1)(a) and (b). 
406 S 12(1)(c). 
407 S 12(1)(d). 
408 S 12(3). 
409 S 12(5). 
410 Submission to NCOP ad hoc committee by AGSA dated 8 June 2018. 
411 The Auditor-General may at any reasonable time audit any represented political party’s books, records of 




Parliament for the running of their operations or the use of their funds. The AGSA’s comments, 
however, seem to overlook the persuasive minority judgment of Cameron J in My Vote 
Counts 1, in which he stated that the funds political parties receive are inextricably tied to their 
pivotal role in our country’s democratic functioning and therefore serve a ‘distinctly public 
purpose’;412 therefore by extension, political parties can and should be made to account to 
Parliament under the aegis of the AGSA.  
Chapter 5 of the Act provides mechanisms to enforce the regulations, in terms of which the 
Commission is entrusted with wide powers of monitoring and inspection. The Commission 
may request any person to disclose and/or produce any relevant information in whatever form 
and be required to answer questions in relation to that information.413 Provision is also made 
for the Commission to approach the Electoral Court for an order compelling414 compliance 
with a request as set out in section 14(2). The Commission is also empowered to issue 
directions in terms of section 15(1) in lieu of imposing a sanction, but in the event that the 
Commission has no option but to impose a sanction, the following sanctions are available to 
the Commission:  
• Suspension of payment of allocated money under section 16;  
• Recovery of money irregularly accepted or spent under section 17;  
• Imposition of an administrative fine in terms of section 18.  
 
The Act also provides for penalties in the form of imprisonment, for violations related to some 
of its provisions.415 However, as Lodge states, ‘[i]n theory, national politicians acknowledge 
the importance of reducing corruption, even if they are not always willing to undertake the 
political risks attendant upon punishing prominent offenders’.416 
The intention to align this Act with globally adopted regulatory norms is evident. The Act is 
the result of a robust consultative process and represents a significant step in promoting the 
values of openness, accountability and responsiveness as required in the Bill of Rights, and it 
is widely lauded as a significantly progressive step towards cumulatively meeting the 
obligations imposed by sections 1(d), 7(2), 19, 32 and 236 of the Constitution. 
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South Africa has the obligation imposed by section 7(2) of the Constitution to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This injunction is fortified by section 217 of 
the Constitution which requires that ‘all spheres of government maintain high ethical standards, 
provide impartial services, and that they be responsive, accountable and transparent’. 
Transparency is a means towards two ends: the first aims to promote the accountability of 
government and the second to promote greater public participation in government. Access to 
information legislation is therefore pivotal for the informed discussion of government policies 
and actions. Whilst political finance disclosure does not guarantee free and fair elections, 
disclosure of political finances serves as an important anti-corruption measure and these 
broader good governance aims are part of the ideal of the franchise, creating an accountable 
and representative government417 because - ‘in an open and democratic society, government 
should be accountable for its actions and decisions.418 Acquiesce to this commitment is evident 
from the provisions of the Act.  
Disclosure permits additional funds to be made available over and above those in the cash-
strapped public purse, but importantly assists the detection of undue influence in donations by 
enabling the monitoring of how the actions of political parties might benefit donors.419 The 
South African legal framework on political finance is comprehensive in that it provides for 
permissible sources of funding, allowed expenses, disclosure, reporting, enforcement and 
sanctions. These provisions are stated in clear and unambiguous language and a cursory reading 
of the regulations indicates that the Act is objectively rational and based on public-political 
consensus.420  
Regulatory reforms aren’t simply idealistic. They are created in real-world situations which 
pose formidable challenges.421 Under the PAIA these challenges were found to render it under-
inclusive and over-restrictive and this is the mischief that this Act aims to cure. The Act’s 
essentiality lies in the fact that it is crucial to electoral integrity and credibility, which 
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The vision of society proclaimed by the Constitution is an open democracy. There are a number 
of dimensions to that openness and paradoxically, secrecy is one of them.423 Secrecy has 
historic roots, dating back to the days of apartheid rule when the administration was 
preoccupied with official secrecy, enabling advancement of esoteric ideals and creating a 
platform for the proliferation of corruption. Due to the lack of any mechanisms, legal and 
otherwise, to scrutinise government activity, corruption thrived − and the speed with which the 
scourge has spread post-democracy has not been contained, despite the best efforts of the 
constitutional drafters to prevent official secrecy by introducing transparency, openness and 
accountability to the constitutional order.    
Access to information is entrenched as a fundamental human right which aims to exclude the 
perpetuation of the old regime424 and serves as a conduit for the attainment, enjoyment and 
protection of other guaranteed rights. As Jagwanth states, the main aim of allowing access to 
information is to ‘allow an individual to access information that may have an impact on her or 
him so that she or he can meaningfully exercise the other rights in the Bill of Rights’.425 The 
reach of access to information is delineated by the PAIA which provides for  
i) categories of information;  
ii) categories of dispatchers of information; and  
iii) the procedure to be followed to access required information.  
 
However, this delineation, while necessary for the provision of legal certainty, lends the PAIA 
to some unintended strictures which in turn limit its application and invariably impede its aim. 
Whilst the PAIA is the primary law intended to fulfil the right guaranteed by section 32 of the 
Constitution, it is not the only piece of legislation that can facilitate this right; ‘gaps in 
providing access to information concerning specific rights might be filled by separate 
legislation where section 32 is not the central concern of that legislation’.426   
The Political Party Funding Act is one such piece of legislation. Its preamble makes plain that 
it is intended to incorporate the principle of transparency in the funding of political parties in 
order to address the proliferation of corruption which has festered within political finance. But 
what exactly is required of an Act which is meant to facilitate transparency, encourage 
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accountability and promote the core objectives of a participatory democracy? First, this 
legislation falls to be construed in line with the broad objectives of the PAIA and secondly, it 
has to be interpreted against the backdrop of the mischief it intends to cure. 
The future of the nation largely stands or falls on how elections are conducted, who gets elected 
into public office, how and why they get voted in.427 Voting is regarded as a ‘formal expression 
of preference’428 and ‘voting patterns indicate that the electorate is gravitating towards making 
rational choices during elections, which choices are based on the information available to 
them’.429 These conclusions fortify the inextricable link between access to information and the 
proper exercise of the right to vote, which is critical to the coming into being of the different 
arms of state and the effective and efficient functioning of the entire state machinery.430 Against 
this backdrop the need for transparency, openness and accountability from those seeking public 
office is undeniable.431 Accountability, as this paper has demonstrated, is unattainable if the 
government has a monopoly on the information which informs its policies, decisions and 
actions.432 During the campaign period, political parties vie for votes by putting forward 
promises of how government administration will function, should they be elected to office. As 
such, the information that political parties disseminate becomes fundamental to the proper 
exercise of the right to vote. Not only does this information aid in the facilitation and enjoyment 
of political rights, but it also speaks to the overall intention of the democratic core of our 
constitutional order, which rests on the pillar of participatory democracy.433 Participation in 
turn creates a platform for scrutiny,434 the significance of which goes beyond affording the 
electorate the ability to make informed choices but also shines the light on the largely uncharted 
area of government administration.  
The grand scale of malfeasance and corruption within government administration indicates just 
how little we know about to whom office-bearers are indebted. What we do know is that 
political parties are mainly financed by private sources, and what we can accept is that political 
parties cannot function efficiently and effectively without adequate financial resources.435 
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However, it is the way that this money infiltrates the political system436 and the extent to which 
parties are beholden to donors, that continues to cripple the democratic order. States are 
increasingly becoming aware that corruption presents a serious threat to their core principles 
and values and hinders social and economic development. As a result, there has been a growing 
acceptance of the need to address the problem in a coordinated, comprehensive and sustainable 
manner.437 The problem has mainly been rooted in a ‘lack of consensus around definitions, 
classifications and typologies’438 all of which stood in the way of adequate regulatory reforms. 
Therefore, the international guidelines for drafting regulatory frameworks include439 limiting 
campaign spending, setting donation limits, prohibiting certain types of donations, providing 
public funding, balancing public and private sources, increasing transparency though 
disclosure requirements and providing for compliance and enforcement.  
South Africa’s regulatory efforts align broadly with these guidelines, despite the Act containing 
lacunae which can allow unscrupulous donors to circumvent its intended purpose. Corruption 
thrives due to formalised weaknesses within systems and therefore freedom of information 
legislation usually involves detailed and complex provisions, defining the nature and limits of 
the right and the requisite conditions for its enforcement440 in order to limit the scope for 
corruption. However, the Political Party Funding Act, while being of great moment, remains 
too open-ended and generous in its intention. First, the Act’s disclosure ceiling, with no 
concomitant donor ban at the same ceiling, paves the way for multiple donations to be made 
under the ceiling by the same donor. Since ‘donor’ is not defined, nothing bars the 
circumvention of the donation ceiling from the same family of donors. This paper has argued 
that the best way to circumvent the donation ceiling lacuna is to first define the term ‘donor’ 
so as to exclude single donations from the same family of donors and at the same time reducing 
the donation ceiling to an amount that would create an undue administrative burden on donors 
who intend to circumvent the ceiling. Given South Africa’s stark wealth divides, the current 
ceiling invariably excludes a majority of the voting population, thereby doing nothing to 
alleviate the capture between private interests and political candidates. Furthermore, the issues 
of donations by foreign entities need to be more strictly regulated. Policy considerations vary 
from party to party and any party can accept a donation from a foreign entity and claim that the 
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donation is for “skills and/or policy development”. Policies are never cast in stone and as such, 
parties can oscillate between policy considerations in order to fall within the allowable category 
of receiving funding from foreign entities. These lacunae are too easily navigable, rending the 
Act’s intended purpose redundant. The Act also fails to facilitate the functioning of South 
Africa’s multi-party democratic system which seeks to have political parties operate from a 
level playing field. This is so because the allocation of money received via the Multi-Party 
Democracy Fund is limited only to parties that are represented in the National Assembly. 
Secondly, the proportionality and equity splits would see many parties unable to maximise their 
campaign efforts and therefore offend against the entitlements of section 19(1)(c). The current 
public funding model already isolates most parties, and so the proportionality and equity split 
should do more to bridge the financial gap and create a platform for other political parties to 
benefit from the funds collected and be less reliant on private donors.    
While there is no panacea for institutionalised ills like corruption, measures can be put in place 
to limit its scope, particularly within government administration. South Africa’s regulatory 
attempts prima facie mirror internationally acceptable criteria for regulating political finance 
and abating the corruption that accompanies it, but fails to take South Africa’s unique political 
climate into consideration, thus creating an opportunity for donors to be more creative in their 
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